States against the Soviet Union. In between, in the 1960s, Beijing
attempted to go its own self-reliant way. The lesson from this period
was that in a bipolar world, China made a difference when allied to
one superpower or the other, but carried much less weight on its own,
even (after 1964) as a nuclear power. To enhance its international
standing, Beijing had to play the triangular game. It did so with two
immediate concerns: regime survival and protection of national secu-
rity; and one longer term goal: enhancement of international status.
After the ‘century of shame’, the PRC was determined to take its
place as a major world power, not as the centre of its own world order,
but definitely as a leader of other nations. In succession, Beijing pro-
claimed itself leader of revolutionary movements throughout Asia, by
virtue of the superior model provided by its own revolution; of newly
independent neutral Third World states; of armed insurgency
throughout the world (in the radical 1960s); and of all opponents of
Soviet hegemonism. Such leadership claims were difficult to sustain,
however, in the face of reluctance by most nations to be led. Nowhere
was this more evident than in the one region above all others that
China wanted to exercise significant influence, and that was Southeast
Asia.
Throughout this period Chinese foreign policy was weighed
down by Marxist ideology. The small foreign policy decision-making
elite was both communist and Chinese. Their worldview was an
amalgam of ideology and their own historical experience, infused by
traditional Chinese sinocentrism.^17 On the one hand, they wanted to
enhance China’s national standing; on the other, they believed they
had a duty to promote world revolution. Given their Marxist belief in
the progressivism of history and the superiority of the socialist eco-
nomic mode of production, the Chinese leadership believed both goals
could be achieved in tandem. As the leading force behind the global
revolution that would inevitably sweep the world, China stood to
regain her leadership among nations. It was a heady vision, but one
that soon ran into the realities of global power relations.
Communism and the Cold War