the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. At the same time as China’s
economic power increased, so too did its military potential, provoking
regional unease and stimulating increased military spending by the
wealthier Southeast Asian states. Of the various matters of contention
between Southeast Asia and China, none was more crucial than the
conflicting claims to sovereignty over the islands of the South China
Sea. At the end of the century, despite China’s oft-repeated desire for
peaceful regional relations, and the determination of Southeast Asian
states to engage rather than confront Beijing, the future of
China–Southeast Asia relations remained a primary concern in all ten
capitals of the expanded Association of Southeast Asia Nations.
Shifting relations in continental Southeast Asia
After Nixon’s visit to China, the countdown to American withdrawal
not just from Vietnam, but from continental Southeast Asia, was just
a matter of time. In Vietnam, the Spring Offensive and Christmas
bombing of 1972 were, in retrospect, not much more than sparring for
advantage prior to the ceasefire of January 1973 that cleared the way
for release of American prisoners of war, and withdrawal of US ground
forces. At that point no-one could foresee the collapse of the South
Vietnamese regime and ignominious US exit two years later, but what
was clear was that the balance of power in the region was about to
change irrevocably. Superpower rivalry would continue, but China
potentially stood to gain from any partial power vacuum.
In the early 1970s Beijing was already working to improve its
image in Southeast Asia that had been so tarnished by the Cultural
Revolution. Informal contacts were established with Southeast Asian
governments, and criticism of them toned down in the Chinese media;
trade was encouraged; and less was said about discrimination against
overseas Chinese (a matter for criticism again during the Cultural
Revolution). Support for revolutionary movements continued, but
Fresh beginnings