years later the Gulf War shocked Beijing by demonstrating just how
high-tech modern warfare had become. In the face of American
weapons superiority, the PRC had very little capacity for force pro-
jection beyond its shores. It did not even have the capability of
taking Taiwan, unless through nuclear blackmail if the United States
withdrew. Even if China remained militarily weak, however, the
steady upgrading of its military capacity worried its Southeast Asian
neighbours. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the wealthier
countries in Southeast Asia considerably increased their own
defence spending, most of it on the latest weapons systems.
The Cambodian problem
What to do about the Vietnamese fait accompli in Cambodia domi-
nated relations between China and Southeast Asia throughout the
1980s. In Beijing there was no doubt about what needed to be done:
the Vietnamese had to be forced to withdraw and their ‘puppet’ Cam-
bodian government replaced. Only thus could Chinese influence in
Cambodia be restored and Vietnamese regional ambitions contained.
The means chosen to bring this about were military, through support
for the Khmer Rouge resistance; economic, to starve Vietnam of multi-
lateral development aid; and diplomatic, to maintain a ‘global united
front’ linking ASEAN, China and the West in opposition to Hanoi’s
‘regional hegemonism’.
Throughout the 1980s China was single-minded in its deter-
mination to bend Vietnam to its will. Chinese feelings towards
Vietnam, as expressed by Chinese leaders, were remarkably bitter.
Chinese estimates of their aid to Vietnam—military and economic—
since 1949, ran into several billion dollars, for the most part
non-repayable. Vietnam’s lack of gratitude or any sense of obligation
angered China. To turn around and side with the Soviet Union,
China’s principal enemy, was to Beijing an unforgivable act of betrayal
Fresh beginnings