A Short History of China and Southeast Asia

(Ann) #1

come to the aid of Thailand in the event of a Vietnamese attack. This
was exactly the response the Thais wanted. In the mid-1980s, the mil-
itary relationship between China and Thailand was strengthened by
the Thai purchase of Chinese heavy weapons, including surface-to-air
missiles and naval vessels, at minimal ‘friendship’ prices. This bur-
geoning military relationship with China caused mounting concern
among Thailand’s ASEAN partners, especially Indonesia. There was
recognition, however, that Thailand as the frontline state facing
battle-hardened Vietnamese forces on its border had genuine security
concerns, so despite some qualms, ASEAN solidarity held firm. In fact
the security front forged during the Cambodian crisis significantly
strengthened the sense of common purpose among ASEAN member
states enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
China and the United States also brought economic and politi-
cal pressure to bear on Vietnam, through trade embargoes and vetoes
on multinational financial lending. The Chinese strategy was to
‘bleed’ Vietnam into submission. The Vietnamese, good Marxists as
they were, held to their belief that history was on their side and that
‘contradictions’ between members of the de facto coalition arrayed
against them would lead to its disintegration. In the event, it was the
Soviet Union that proved the weak reed, and the contradictions that
developed were between an overextended Soviet Union bogged down
in Afghanistan, and an overextended Vietnam approaching economic
collapse.
By 1988 the shape of a solution to the Cambodian problem had
begun to emerge. As of 1982, China had begun to distance itself from
the United States and adopt a more even-handed policy towards the
two superpowers. This opened up the possibility of normalisation of
relations with the Soviet Union. From Beijing’s point of view,
however, ‘three obstacles’ stood in the way. The first two were the pres-
ence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and along China’s northern
frontier. The third was Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation
of Cambodia. In the end the Soviets gave way: it was more important


Fresh beginnings
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