involving it in as many international and regional ‘dialogues’ as pos-
sible. In a number of these (the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation
[APEC] forum and ARF are examples), ASEAN speaks with a single
voice. Even in bilateral discussions involving ASEAN member states,
there is now a multilateral element present. How China conducts its
bilateral relations with each Southeast Asian state, therefore, influ-
ences, to a much greater degree than previously, its relations with
others. There is no better example of the implications of this than the
way in which conflicting claims to the islands of the South China Sea
impact on China–Southeast Asia relations.
The South China Sea
China claims two principal groups of islands in the South China Sea,
the Paracel (Xisha) islands and the Spratly (Nansha) islands. While
the former are entirely in Chinese hands, though also claimed by
Vietnam, the latter are only partially occupied by the PRC. Vietnam,
Malaysia, the Philippines and even Taiwan occupy one or more of the
Spratlys. In fact, claims by ASEAN member states overlap each other
as well as the comprehensive PRC claim.
The Paracel islands lie south of Hainan, an equal distance off the
Vietnamese coast. Some were seized by the PRC from the Republic of
(South) Vietnam in 1956, and the rest in 1974 when China apparently
feared a unified Vietnam might allow a Soviet presence there. On
neither occasion did Hanoi protest, though China’s actions amounted
to the forcible annexation of territory occupied by Vietnam. In fact,
until 1974, Vietnam apparently recognised China’s claim to both
archipelagos. Only when relations broke down over Cambodia did
Hanoi formally claim both island groups. For China, however, posses-
sion of the Paracels is a fait accompli and there is nothing to discuss.
The boundary agreement signed between China and Vietnam in 2000
covered only the land frontier and territorial waters in the Gulf of
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia