Chinese foreign policy. Sheng Lijun argues that Chinese perceptions
of status discrepancy have comprised four elements: between China’s
glorious past and less distinguished present; between China’s sense of
its own importance and the recognition accorded it by the world com-
munity; between China’s desire to exercise political influence and its
limited means of doing so; and between China’s current power and
influence and how it believes these will be enhanced in the future.^1
The Chinese believe they should stand at the apex of the status hier-
archy of peoples (and states) that they have always taken to be the
natural order of things. Status enhancement has been pursued, as we
have seen, in several ways: through military means to demonstrate that
China cannot be trifled with; through developing nuclear weapons;
through manipulating relations with powerful states; through claiming
leadership of one or another movement or group of nations (revolu-
tionary forces, Third World countries, and so on); and through steady
enhancement of Chinese power (political and economic, as well
as military). Reunification (the definitive inclusion of Taiwan and
the Spratlys in the empire-state) would powerfully contribute to
the same goal.
In summary, China’s strategic goals are to reunify the empire-
state, prevent its disintegration (as happened to the Soviet Union),
secure its frontiers, and enhance its international standing to the status
of an undisputed ‘great power’. Of course, status cannot simply be
claimed; it has to be recognised by others, and that recognition must
be expressed for the Chinese in appropriately deferential ways. Just as
superiors are treated deferentially by inferiors in personal relationships,
so, through the subtle rituals of diplomacy, can status be recognised
among states.
How China’s strategic goals are likely to impact on her relations
with Southeast Asia depends on the great power strategic balance, and
how this may change. The PRC, from its inception, encountered
a bipolar world in which it first leaned to the Soviet Union, then to
isolationism, then to the United States, and eventually tried to play a
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