Not only the United States stands in the way of attainment of
China’s strategic goals: the country also faces enormous internal prob-
lems. Its population is still increasing; so is environmental degradation;
and the pressure on land is becoming acute. A massive internal migra-
tion is underway as rural peasants seek employment and better living
conditions in the cities of the eastern seaboard. Already these popu-
lation movements are being felt outside China as increasing numbers
of Chinese filter into northern Burma and Laos. Social turmoil in
China would threaten not only to destabilise the regime, but also to
spill over into Southeast Asia. This is one reason why few in Southeast
Asia are critical of authoritarian central government in China (which
gives a strategic twist to the Asian values debate).
China thus faces great obstacles in pursuing her strategic goals.
But these goals are unlikely to change, and the Chinese are as patient
as they are determined. The question is not, therefore, will China
actively pursue her strategic goals, but when and how.
Three scenarios
In a recent study of China’s ‘grand strategy’, Michael Swaine and
Ashley Tellis of the Rand Corporation argue that China is currently
pursuing what they term a ‘calculative strategy’.^4 The key elements of
this strategy are to promote a market economy in an amicable inter-
national environment in order to ensure rapid economic growth; to
avoid the use of force while modernising military capability; and
to expand China’s international political influence, including through
multilateral interaction. This is a pragmatic policy designed to lay the
foundations for a strong and modern China. As long as it lasts, China
is likely to be amenable in its international relations, both in its deal-
ings with major powers and with its Southeast Asian neighbours. Thus
China is ready to resolve relatively minor differences over land borders
(as it has with Vietnam), while postponing decisions on sea frontiers.
Future directions