throughout the archipelago over which inland kingdoms such as
Mataram exercised, at best, limited control. Trade in the hands of both
Muslim and Chinese merchants took precedence over diplomacy in
shaping the relationship with successive Chinese dynasties. Thus
independent Indonesia could look back on no long historical
kingdom-to-empire bilateral relations regime of the kind developed
between China and Vietnam, or Thailand, or Burma. Even less could
the Philippines, whose significant trade relations with China (apart
from Sulu) post-date the arrival of the Spanish and were conducted
under their auspices.
The relationship between Indonesia and China has indeed been
‘troubled’,^8 for several reasons. One is that nowhere else in Southeast
Asia has the problem of overseas Chinese proved so prickly. This is
because, for reasons of past policy and religious differences, nowhere
else (with the exception of Malaysia) has the Chinese community
been so poorly assimilated. Another reason is that Indonesia, despite
its continuing focus on internal security, has seen itself as the natural
leader in the region, and has been reluctant to allow room for China.
A third reason is that Indonesia sees itself as an Islamic state and, as
such, looks west to the great centres of the Islamic world more readily
than it looks north to China. No other Southeast Asian nation, apart
from the Philippines, has had its international relations culture less
shaped historically by the need to accommodate China. There has,
therefore, been correspondingly less historical basis on which to build
a mutually acceptable Indonesia–China bilateral relations regime.
Given these factors, it would be in China’s interests if Indonesia
split into smaller polities more easily dominated by the PRC. This was
the more prevalent pattern historically. Of course, China is not going
to encourage the break-up of Indonesia: it would just not be too con-
cerned if this happened. This is not the case for ASEAN, for which a
strong and unified Indonesia provides a much more substantial coun-
terweight to China than would a plethora of small states. Nor would it
be in the interests of the West.
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia