China and ASEAN
The division that exists between continental and maritime states, in
the place China occupies in their international relations, has not pre-
vented consensus so far on one point: balance-of-power containment
of China is not the way to go. Far better to engage China in as many
ways as possible, to build a set of common interests that will bind the
PRC to the region. In large part this consensus has been arrived at
through ‘the ASEAN way’ of non-confrontational consultation and
discussion.^10 ASEAN has encouraged not just exchanges of views
between member states that have enhanced mutual understanding of
differing international relations cultures, but has also developed a
sense of solidarity and common identity vis-à-vis outside powers,
China included. But would this solidarity hold up in the face of an
assertive China and an exigent United States?
It is significant that what forged a degree of solidarity between
the original ASEAN five was not, as in the case of the European
Union, the need to overcome a legacy of war between member states,
but rather the need to confront a sudden external threat, and to agree
on a role for China in what was a regional crisis. The external threat
was to Thailand in the form of aggressive Indochinese communism.
Thailand, as the front-line state, was much more eager to turn to
China for support than was Indonesia, which then had no diplomatic
relations with Beijing. Agreement came out of deliberations that drew
upon the Indonesian concepts of consultation and consensus. The
concerted policy agreed upon was to force the withdrawal of Viet-
namese forces and restore the neutrality of Cambodia by allowing
China an essential role in funnelling support to the despised Khmer
Rouge via Thailand.
There are two things to note about the precedent set in ASEAN’s
response to the Third Indochina War for future relations with China.
The first is that if the primacy given to the strategic needs of a front-
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia