Future directionsThis leaves open the fate of the islands of the South China Sea.
An assertive China would certainly want control of the Spratlys, but
is there anything ASEAN could do to prevent that happening? Soli-
darity would not be enough once China has a blue water navy, even
given ASEAN’s combined military resources. Besides, ASEAN states
would have to sort out their own overlapping claims in order to present
a common front to Beijing. Only the United States could stand in the
way of a determined Chinese invasion of islands garrisoned by ASEAN
states. But the Spratlys are not Taiwan, and the US might be reluctant
to risk war for a few atolls. The political fallout might deter Beijing,
though it hardly did during the Maoist period. The only policy for
Southeast Asian states, therefore, would appear to be to continue to
engage China while at the same time quietly encouraging a continued
US presence without committing themselves to any balance-of-power
alliance. It is a fine line to hew in the face of China’s determined drive
for status recognition and American arrogance of power, and it may
still not be enough to save the Spratlys.
In the longer term, the countries of Southeast Asia must face the
challenge of developing bilateral relations regimes with China that
both protect their own interests and security and accommodate those
of China, as the de facto regional hegemon and great power. It would
hardly be surprising if in doing so they draw upon the cultural pre-
suppositions and historical precedents that, as I have shown, lie buried
deep within their respective international relations cultures.