There is considerable debate about how relations between states
should be understood. For a discussion of opposing views, see
Robert Powell, ‘Anarchy in international relations theory: the
neorealist–neoliberal debate’, International Organization, vol. 48,
1994, pp. 313–44.
This is well demonstrated in Stephen J. Morris, Why Vietnam
Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War, Stanford
University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1999.
That states have different attitudes to the use of military force is
recognised in the notion of ‘strategic culture’, defined as ‘a distinc-
tive and lasting set of beliefs, values and habits regarding the threat and
use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as
geopolitical setting, history and political culture’.Ken Booth and Russel
Trood, eds, Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region, Macmillan,
London, 1999, p. 8 (italics in original). For a useful discussion of
different views on ‘strategic culture’, see Alastair Iain Johnston,
‘Thinking about strategic culture’, International Securityvol. 19,
1995, pp. 32–64; and Colin S. Gray, ‘Strategic culture as context:
the first generation of theory strikes back’, Review of International
Studies, vol. 25, 1999, pp. 49–69.
A regime in international relations comprises agreed upon princi-
ples, norms, rules and procedures that form the basis for expected
and acceptable state behaviour. States cooperate in regimes not
primarily because they will be punished in some way for not doing
so, but because it is in their interests that other states should
accept the same principles, norms and obligations. See, for
