centuries that not only kept China at bay for most of the time, but also
allowed the Vietnamese to engage their traditional enemies, the
Cham, and to pursue their long ‘march to the south’ (nam tien) that
over the next seven centuries would leave them in control of all
coastal Vietnam, to the Mekong delta and beyond.
Southeast Asia and the Song
During the first millennium CE China was never a naval power. The
Chinese continued to be predominantly an inland people, intent on
guarding their frontiers against security threats that came from the
north and west. Apart from expeditions by sea to punish neighbouring
Korea and Champa, the only significant naval operations during the
Tang period were to control piracy. The Chinese were learning much
about the sea, however. Whereas early trade, as we have seen, was con-
ducted largely in foreign vessels, during the Tang Chinese began
building their own merchant ships and sailing them to the Southern
Ocean. Their models were the larger and more seaworthy vessels sailed
directly to Chinese ports by Malay, Persian, Indian and Arab mer-
chants. The Song continued this tradition of boat building. When the
dynasty lost control of northern China, it needed to construct a sub-
stantial navy to defend its new capital on the Yangze River. The
impetus this gave to Chinese maritime trade particularly affected
Southeast Asia, not least through the growth of Chinese merchant
communities in the region.
Meanwhile the political face of Southeast Asia was changing
as new kingdoms arose. To the south of Dai Viet, the Cham were still
powerful. In Cambodia the kingdom of Angkor was in the ascendant.
In southern Thailand, the Mon kingdom of Dvaravati was in diplo-
matic contact with China, but not, apparently, the other two Mon
kingdoms of Thaton in southern Burma and Haripunjaya in northern
Thailand. In northern Burma, the Burmese had founded the kingdom
Early relations