either Buddhism or Hinduism, less prepared to make room for them in
a comprehensive worldview. Beyond the ummatstood the unbelievers,
and they included most Chinese. The space this opened up between
Malays/Indonesians and overseas Chinese has hardly been bridged to
this day, for the only way to close it is through conversion.
The Islamic worldview influenced relations between China and
the Muslim Malay/Indonesian world in significant ways. Acceptance
of Islam drew the region into an alternative international order, one
that looked to sultan or caliph as primus inter paresamong Muslim
rulers, designated by Allah to preside over the congregation of believ-
ers. Such a worldview allowed no cosmic dimension for the Son of
Heaven. Indeed, the very concept was blasphemous, as it was for
Christianity. Chinese power might be respected, to the point where
the rulers of minor Muslim states were prepared to perform the kowtow
before Chinese emperors, but the cosmic basis of the Chinese world
order could never be accommodated by Islam. With the conversion of
the Malay/Indonesian world to Islam, intellectual compromise with
the Chinese world order was rendered virtually impossible. While this
had little effect on trade relations, it did in time alter the context in
which official relations were conducted—not for the Chinese for
whom all official missions were taken as tributary recognition of the
exemplary virtue of the Son of Heaven, but for Malays and Indo-
nesians for whom diplomatic relations were undertaken for entirely
pragmatic reasons.
Conclusion
The Mongol invasions extended the frontiers of the Chinese empire to
include Yunnan, but their armies failed to incorporate either Burma or
Vietnam, and their war fleets failed to subdue either Japan or Java. The
lesson learned, once the aggressive phase of the dynasty subsided and it
became increasingly Chinese, was that nominal acceptance of China’s
Mongol expansionism