(1905–07), Third Sea Lord and controller of the navy
(1908–10), commander of the Atlantic Fleet (1910–11),
and Second Sea Lord (1913–14).
Jellicoe was promoted to vice admiral and named
commander in chief of the Grand Fleet on 4 August
1914 at the outbreak of the First World War. He spent
his first months in command blockading Germany from
resupply of commercial and war matériel. He came
under some criticism, both from the government and
the press, for his “timidity” in not taking on the German
fleet. However, he could do little in this respect since the
German navy remained in home waters. In May 1916,
Jellicoe’s advance squadron under David beatty de-
tected movement by German ships into the North Sea.
This led to the Battle of Jutland. Historian George Bruce
writes:
The German High Seas Fleet under Admiral [Re-
inhard] Scheer deliberately or by accident met
the British Fleet engaged in a sweep of the North
Sea. Admiral [Franz] Von Hipper commanded
five battle cruisers, while Scheer followed 50
miles behind with 16 new and eight old battle-
ships. There were also 11 light cruisers and 63
destroyers. The British fleet, under Admiral Jel-
licoe, consisted of the northern group of three
battle cruisers and 24 battleships commanded
by Jellicoe himself; and the southern fleet, [com-
manded by] Admiral Beatty, six battle cruisers
and four battleships. In addition there were
34 light cruisers and 80 destroyers. Beatty and
Hipper sighted each other, and Hipper turned
to link up with Scheer, after which the two
groups shelled each other. Beatty then turned
back to lure the Germans into Jellicoe’s hands
and in the process lost two of his battleships, but
the maneuver accomplished, the entire British
fleet soon formed a line east and southeast into
which the Germans were sailing as into a net.
Just when their destruction seemed certain, the
weather closed down and rescued the Germans,
who later, under the cover of darkness, skillfully
made their escape. The Royal Navy lost three
battle cruisers, three light cruisers and eight de-
stroyers; Germany [lost] four cruisers and five
destroyers, but the morale of the German Navy
had been destroyed. Thenceforward it avoidedbattle, for the sailors threatened mutiny at the
prospect.The losses in manpower for each side pointed more to
a German victory than a British one: The Germans lost
2,545 men and no prisoners, while the British lost 6,097
men and 177 prisoners. Despite what appeared to be
a British “victory” because of the German withdrawal,
Jellicoe was savaged by British public opinion, perhaps
because only 12 German ships were lost and their casu-
alties were much lighter. Historian James Lucas writes:
“What the British public had expected... was a Nel-
son-style victory, not an inconclusive battle. Ships of the
Grand Fleet were greeted by boos, while the newspapers,
to whom Beatty was a hero through his battle cruiser
exploits, accused Jellicoe of bungling the battle. At the
subsequent Court of Inquiry, Beatty’s statements seemed
to substantiate this.” However, when, two years later, the
German fleet surrendered at Scapa (November 1918), it
was clearly Jellicoe’s cautious strategy of waiting them
out, rather than taking them on and incurring losses,
that had won the day.
Writing in his memoir The Grand Fleet, Jellicoe ex-
plains why he initiated the strategy he did against the
German fleet:[A] victory is judged not merely by material losses
and damage, but by its results. It is profitable to
examine the results of the Jutland Battle. With
the single exception of a cruise towards the Eng-
lish coast on August 19th, 1916—undertaken, no
doubt, by such part of the High Sea Fleet as had
been repaired in order to show that it was still
capable of going to sea—the High Sea Fleet never
again, up to the end of 1917, ventured much out-
side the “Heligoland triangle,” and even on Au-
gust 19th, 1916, the much reduced Fleet made
precipitately for home as soon as it was warned by
its Zeppelin scouts of the approach of the Grand
Fleet. This is hardly the method of procedure that
would be adopted by a Fleet flushed with vic-
tory and belonging to a country which was being
strangled by the sea blockade.Historians now agree that not only was Jutland a strate-
gic success for Britain, but it meant the end of the Ger-
man surface fleet as a factor in the war.0 Jellicoe, John RuShwoRth, eARl Jellicoe oF ScApA