such experience might have proved later. Like his
contemporary and equally inexperienced subor-
dinate, General [Ferdinand] foch, Joffre was a
believer in in the offensive à l’outrance—although,
divorced from actual field command, he was not
personally responsible for its tactical application.
Utterly unprepared for—indeed, utterly unable
to conceive the implications of—such an offen-
sives as that outlined in the [German] Schlief-
fen Plan, Joffre was responsible for launching the
French strategic [offensive], a calamitous front
attack by waves of infantry over a ground which
should have been discarded as suicidal seventy
years previously with the invention of the ma-
chine gun.While Joffre’s offensive did work at first—by September
the French had thrown the Germans back to the Aisne
River in anticipation of the Battle of the Marne—it led
to the disastrous trench warfare that caused the war to
grind to a stalemate and bring hundreds of thousands of
casualties on both sides.
Criticism of Joffre grew more and more intense,
but he was protected by Alexandre Millerand, the French
minister of war. On 30 October 1915, Millerand was
replaced by General Joseph-Simon Galliéni, who had
come to realize that Joffre needed to be replaced as com-
mander. Nevertheless, on 3 December 1915 Joffre was
given the command of all the French armies fighting in
Europe. In this capacity, he tried to break the stalemate
in the trenches on the western front. On 25 February
1916, he named General Henri-Philippe Pétain as chief
of the French forces at the Verdun front in an attempt
to break the German hold on that area in northeastern
France. However, the Verdun front could not be bro-
ken, and on 7 March 1916, Minister Galliéni advised
the Conseil Supérior that there needed to be a reform of
the high command. His advice was dismissed, and Jof-
fre remained in control. Angered, Galliéni resigned on
17 March and was replaced by General Rocques, a close
friend of Joffre. Anger over Joffre’s mismanagement of
the entire Allied campaign continued, and when French
general Robert niVelle retook the fort of Douaumont,
he was seen as a probable successor to Joffre. Finally,
on 13 December 1916, after massive French losses at
Verdun, continuing failure to break the war’s stalemate,
and a growing feeling that Joffre was out of his element,
Joffre was named as “technical adviser” to the govern-
ment. Though retaining his title as commander in chief
of French forces, he was shunted aside as the operational
commander, a role now assigned to General Nivelle.
Joffre’s “promotion” was the end of his career, and
he was reduced to a ceremonial role. Thirteen days after
being removed from command, he was named marshal
of France. In 1917, he made a tour of North America,
and in 1918 he was named as president of the Conseil
Supérior de la Guerre, retiring from the military soon
after. He died in Paris on 3 January 1931, and his mem-
oirs were published posthumously in two volumes in
1932.References: Kahn, Alexander, Life of General Joffre, Coo-
per’s Son Who Became Commander-in-Chief (London:
W. Heinemann, 1915); Recouly, Raymond, Joffre (NewJoseph Joffre (right) talking with André Maginot on Ar-
mistice Day, Paris, 1918
JoFFRe, JoSeph-JAcqueS-céSAiRe