numerically, because he had his opponent at a psycho-
logical disadvantage before the battle, because he dared
to take the initiative, and because the fruit of victory was
the birth of Europe, from where most of the great gener-
als of history were to come.”
Historian George Bruce writes: “Being greatly
outnumbered, Miltiades altered the usual arrangement
of the Greek line, so as to extend his wings across the
whole width of the valley in which the battle was fought,
and thus escape being outflanked. To effect that he was
forced to weaken his center, which was repulsed, but
both his wings drove back the invaders, and then fell
upon and routed the victorious Persian center. The Per-
sians fled in confusion to their ships, which they suc-
ceeded in launching, and escaped with a loss of 6,400
men. The Athenians lost 192 only, and inspired other
Greek states to resist [Persian oppression].”
Darius tried to invade Athens itself, but Miltiades
and his forces rushed to the city and were able to ward off
this secondary assault. According to Plutarch’s biography
of Miltiades, the hero of Marathon was given “a fleet of
threescore and ten gallies... to make war upon the Iles
which had aided the Persians.” One of the islands he at-
tacked, Paros, held out against his invasion, and when he
went ashore to visit with Timo, a priestess on Paros, he
was seriously wounded and taken back to Athens, where
he was impeached by the Greek legislature for some un-
known crime, found guilty, and ordered to pay a fine.
Before he could do this, however, he succumbed to the
wound he suffered on Paros, dying in either 488 or 489
b.c. His son Cimon paid the fine, and Miltiades’ name
was cleared. In modern histories, his role in defeating
the Persians at Marathon and saving the concept of the
Greek city-state, from which democracy sprang, is why
this remarkable victory is always included in lists of the
most important battles in world history.
References: Plutarch, The Lives of Epaminondas, of Philip
of Macedon, of Dionysius the Elder, and of Octavius Cæsar
Augustus: Collected out of Good Authors... , translated by
Sir Thomas North (London: Richard Field, 1603), 120–
122; Nepos, Cornelius, The Lives of T. Pomponius Atticus,
Miltiades, and Cimon... , translated by Richardson Pack
(London: E. Curll, 1735); Nepos, Cornelius, Cornelius
Nepos’ Life of Miltiades, edited by M. Hughes (London:
City of London Book Depot, 1901); Nepos, Cornelius,
Lives of Miltiades and Epaminondas, edited by J. E. Mel-
luish (London: Blackie & Son, 1901); Ward, George,
A Close Translation of the Lives of Miltiades and Epami-
nondas (London: Ralph, Holland & Co., 1901); Laffin,
John, “Unorthodoxy at Marathon,” in Links of Leadership:
Thirty Centuries of Command (London: George G. Harrap
& Co., Ltd., 1966), 35–50; Bruce, George, “Marathon,”
in Collins Dictionary of Wars (Glasgow, Scotland: Harper-
Collins Publishers, 1995), 154.Mohammed Ibn Da 2 ud See alP-arslan.Moltke, Helmuth Johannes Ludwig, count von
Moltke (1848–1916) German general
Born in Gersdorf, Mecklenburg, on 23 May 1848,
Helmuth Johannes Ludwig Moltke was the nephew of
Helmuth Karl Bernard moltke. He entered the officer’s
corps in 1870, although he did not see service during his
uncle’s successful campaign against France, which led to
the consolidation of Prussia and other states into mod-
ern Germany. In 1902, Moltke was given the command
of the 1st Division of the German Guards Corps, fol-
lowed by his being named as quartermaster general in
1904 and chief of the general staff of the German army
two years later, again following in his uncle’s footsteps.
At the outbreak of the First World War in August
1914, Moltke, then chief of the General Staff, was in
failing health. Despite this, he continued to direct the
German strategic plan for the war. His fatal error was
the change he made to the plans of his predecessor as
chief of the General Staff, General Alfred von Schlieffen.
Moltke’s uncle’s fear following German unification in
1871 was that the nation could face simultaneous attack
from France to the west and Russia to the east. In evolv-
ing a strategy to deal with this situation, von Schlieffen
devised the “Schlieffen Plan,” a lightning strike through
neutral Belgium into Northern France, bypassing the
immensely strong French fortresses at Metz and Verdun,
to the south. If done quickly enough, Paris would fall,
France would capitulate, and Germany could then turn
to the east to fight Russia. However, as von Schlieffen’s
successor, Moltke modified the plan, moving several
divisions from the right wing, advancing (through Bel-
gium) to shore up the left wing marching on Verdun.
This modification undermined the entire plan, as an
overwhelming right wing was needed to overcome any
resistance before Paris was reached. Further, this al-
lowed for less time to mobilize the troops to wheel backmoltke, helmuth JohAnneS luDwig, count von moltke