380 music, philosophy, and modernity
seems problematic, or that music has to be primarily construed as
a philosophical mystery. Remember Martha Nussbaum’s remark that
‘Musical works are somehow able – and, after all, this “somehow” is no
more and no less mysterious than the comparable symbolic ability of
language – to embody the idea of our urgent need for and attachment
to things outside ourselves that we do not control, in a tremendous
variety of forms’ (Nussbaum 2001 : 272 ). However, the ramifications of
such challenges to dominant forms of philosophical legitimation are
evidently not straightforward.
Afurther way of approaching what is at stake here is via the parallel
which can be drawn between art and religion. One great strength of
what emerged from the Enlightenment was, and is, the insistence on
public verification of validity claims, based on evidence, consistency,
relevance, etc.^3 In chapter 4 I cited Cavell’s comment with regard to
aesthetic judgement that ‘if you do not see something,withoutexplana-
tion, then there is nothing further to discuss’ (Cavell 1976 : 93 ). Only on
the basis of a prior intuitive sharing of the sense that there is something
that matters in ‘aesthetic experience’ – both as reception and as pro-
duction – can it become the object of discursive argument. If the core
aspects of theology lie outside the realm of explanation and legitimation
by evidence and argument, as the modern world has shown that they
do, both religion and art are excluded from the publicly warrantable,
evidence-based validity that is required of the sciences. The question is
whether this is necessarily to be regarded as a problem. Rorty suggests
the link that I want to make here when he cites Max Weber’s idea of
those who are ‘religiously unmusical’: ‘One can be tone-deaf when it
comes to religion just as one can be oblivious to the charms of music.’
He refers to this idea as a way of indicating some of the consequences
of an anti-representationalist approach to contemporary philosophy.
Both music and religion can simply seem pointless to some people, and
‘Philosophy resembles music in this respect’ (Rorty and Vattimo 2005 :
30 – 1 ).^4 What lies behind Rorty’s comments is his claim that ‘the desire
for universal intersubjective agreement’ is ‘just one human need among
3 These days it is perhaps a good idea to stress here that these Enlightenment demands
should not be seen as in conflict with what I am trying to get at. The issue is how we
deal with what is not adequately covered by these demands, not the wholesale putting in
question of those demands.
4 Awareness of the musical, of the kind inherent in the rhythm of communication, in tone,
and the sense of the meaningfulness of expressions which are not verbal will be present
even in those who can’t ‘get’ music as a form of art. To this extent, a complete lack of
the musical may be pathological, even though everyday unmusicality clearly is not. The