conclusion 415Frank says of Heidegger’s related notion of ‘Befindlichkeit’, which has
to do with how one ‘finds oneself’, in the sense of ‘how one is’, that it
expresses itself in moods ‘like a [musical] tonic or a colouring which
unthematically suffuses the life of our mind’ (Frank 2002 : 15 ). ‘Selbst-
gef ̈uhl’isnot an intentional object of consciousness, but it is undoubtedly
present as part of what consciousness is. Music’s ability to express this
non-intentional way of being of the subject should, in the terms I am
trying to establish, not be seen as a merely metaphorical circumvention
of the real issue. It is rather a demonstration of the limits of a theoreti-
cal approach, reminding one of the other ways in which we can relate
to matters that can be inaccessible to discursivity. Only because there is
music can we have an articulated sense of what suffuses our minds in
this manner.
The heading of this section, ‘Music as philosophical expression’,
is another way of referring to what in the Introduction I termed the
‘philosophy of music’ in the subjective genitive, in which philosophy is
seen as emerging from music, instead of determining it as an object.
Music does not describe or give discursive answers to philosophical
problems because its relationship to philosophy is not representational.
It is to be regarded rather as a resource for responding to how certain
kinds of philosophical issue impinge on our lives. Precisely because a
musical response is generally not discursive and representational it may
capture or influence aspects of these issues which philosophy may not.
Music is no doubt irrelevant to many philosophical debates, but nothing
is good for everything, and, given the striking absence of music from
so much contemporary philosophical discussion, it is more interesting
to reflect on the implications of that absence than to contribute to its
continuation.
In the preceding chapters I have at times rhetorically emphasised
the limitations of ‘philosophy’, instead of just seeking to explore phi-
losophy’s limits. My aim has been to offer ways of responding to the
fact that what is at present practised in many areas under the name
of philosophy, particularly in the analytical tradition,hasin many
respects diminished in public significance, to the point where many
non-philosophers (and plenty of philosophers as well) no longer see
the point of much that is being argued about. There must always be a
place for detailed philosophical argument, but it is worth pondering
how many arguments are generated at present by the representational
premises which I have been concerned to question via music. If we still
wish philosophy to be one of the resources for generating meaning and
for coming to terms with modern existence, it needs to address more