inferior species, who lack our intellectual and moral capabilities:
they cannot think, make decisions, or communicate.
The loudest and most successful critic of this view over recent
years has been Peter Singer, whose book, Animal Liberation, has
achieved cult status since its publication in 1975. Singer criticises
meat-eating because he claims it is based on the arbitrary moral dis-
tinction of species: whereas we wouldn’t condone eating humans,
we do accept eating non-human animals. This, he argues, ranks
alongside other arbitrary moral distinctions which we are only too
ready to condemn, like sex or race. These, we believe, are irrelevant
to moral judgements. We condemn racism and sexism, and any other
form of discrimination not based on relevant moral distinctions, like
the practice of treating people differently because they have lower
intelligence.
The only non-arbitrary moral distinction, he argues, is sentience,
the capacity to suffer. This is a prerequisite for having interests. While
there is no moral responsibility if we kick a stone, there is if we kick
a mouse. So, anything that can suffer, that can experience enjoy-
ment and happiness, has interests in avoiding pain and, therefore,
deserves moral consideration.
However, as R. G. Frey points out in his article ‘Pains, Interests,
and Vegetarianism’,^1 it is not the case that the capacity to suffer is a
prerequisite of having interests – it is not, as this suggests, a neces-
sary condition. In fact, he argues, we still speak of people having
interests even when they can feel no pain at all.
His first example is of a soldier friend, who suffered extensive
spinal, head and nervous injuries while serving in Vietnam. He is
conscious, but cannot feel pain, yet still he has interests. Indeed his
interests in being cared for are now greater because of his injuries.
What’s more he has interests in the care of his wife and children,
and in protecting his good name. These interests continue to exist
even though he can feel no pain and even though he may not know
his good name might be harmed.
His second example is that of Karen Quinlan, a comatose patient,
who cannot feel pain, yet who, again, clearly has interests. For
example, as Frey points out, if a photographer entered her room and
photographed her, her interests in maintaining her privacy would
have been invaded; whereas Singer would argue, because she can
feel no pain, she has no interests. In fact, as individuals we all seem
to have interests, like privacy, that have nothing to do with our capac-
ity to feel pain.Note-taking for Criticism and Evaluation 113HTW15 7/26/01 9:10 PM Page 113