By that time, propaganda had advanced to dif-
ferent goals: chief among which was stirring up the
racist and anti-Semitic fervor. As well, propaganda
was effectively used to prepare the German popula-
tion for ‘‘total war,’’ and suppress any opposition
by creating a climate of pervasive fear (angst). Nazi
propaganda did not particularly attend to pictorial
inventiveness, for example, there were no photo-
montages in Nazi propaganda, unlike their com-
mon use with Stalin’s regime in the late 1930s.
Nazi propaganda’s most common quality was a
fairly conventional and straightforward depiction
of idealized German citizens as ‘‘types.’’ It was
this tendency that caused the photographs of
August Sander to become associated with German
propaganda. Thus the selection of appropriate
models was of more concern than the artistry by
which they were photographed and presented. As is
characteristic of propaganda, if necessary, a photo-
graph was produced as a fake—many shots of chil-
dren interacting with Hitler were staged with the
daughters and sons of Nazi officials and not the
spontaneous displays of affection and loyalty by
strangers that they were clearly intended to depict.
There were two common forms of Nazi photo-
graphic propaganda: idyllic photographs of a beau-
tiful country with happy people (often dressed in
various regional costumes) intended to strengthen
and stabilize the identification of the Germans with
the regime, and photographs showing brutal acts
against those deemed political opponents, the mem-
bers of Jewish communities, Roma, and Sinti, and
others not considered as belonging to the German
mainstream. Most of these images mimicked scenes
from movie features: narrow spaces with uncertain
foregrounds, the protagonist Nazis mostly shown
from the back or looming in the background, their
victims depicted from above or angles that made
them seem small and worthy only of hatred.
Japanese nationalist propaganda of the same era
mimicked the Nazi standard by showing beautiful
girls in traditional garb to represent the country’s
‘‘pure’’ history and bolster self-esteem but did not
neglect the dreadful reality of Japanese war crimes
in China.
With the outbreak of World War II came a world
wide propaganda machine. Militaries from all coun-
tries produced leaflets, posters, radio programs, and
illustrated papers in attempts to bolster patriotism
and demoralize the enemy. Specific methods to
achieve these goals varied little. Seen at a distance,
it is clear many of the most celebrated images that
resulted from the war at the time served as propa-
ganda. Robert Capa’s photographs of the Allies
landing at Normandy to Margaret Bourke-White’s
images from Naples, W. Eugene Smith’s and
Edward Steichen’s series of brutal action in the
Pacific Theater to Alfred Eisenstaedt’s V-Day kiss
may seem obvious, but at the same time Cecil Bea-
ton’sAfricaor Arcadij Schaichet’sRoad to Berlin,or
Pierre Jahan’s work for the Resistance in Paris orDe
Ondergedoken Camerain Amsterdam also clearly
served propagandistic purpose. After WWII, with
the superpowers settling into the Cold War, even
more propaganda was stimulated. As well, some
photographers practiced a sort of ‘‘anti-propagan-
da,’’ such as W. Eugene Smith’s series ‘‘The Spanish
Village,’’ which generates much of its power and
meaning contrasted with Spanish dictator Franco’s
bright marble monuments.
Within the framework of the Cold War, propa-
ganda became a delicate business. The world tour
of Edward Steichen’s exhibition The Family of
Man, partly financed by the U.S. Information Ser-
vice and the Coca-Cola Company, has often been
denounced as having been mere propaganda rather
than fulfilling its humanistic stated aims, but at the
same time the common practice of Stalin’s regime
simply to retouch photographs, deleting those no
longer in favor from even previously published,
historical photographs forms the other end of the
propaganda continuum. The historical reality,
however, is always different from the intentions of
the propagandists. Neither could the propagation
of peace and understanding through such efforts as
The Family of Manprevent people from harmful
action, nor were the careers of those ‘‘erased’’ by
Soviet censors really stopped.
In 1989, however, nearly the whole communist
system imploded. History proved right what com-
munication researchers like Hovland and Lazarsfeld
had ascertained in the 1950s at the height of the Cold
War: propaganda as a whole, and photography
within it, could not change people’s minds but sim-
ply strengthened existing tendencies. For the field of
propaganda, this knowledge had two results.
First, propaganda became mostly local or national
in scope. Be it the portraits of national leaders, of
revolutionary martyrs, of war heroes, or of ordinary
people presented in images that are ideologically
sound, these photographs are widely used to fulfill
societal needs, e.g., in the propagation of economic
welfare, birth control, or other sorts of campaigns.
Some of these images have become part of the larger
world culture, such as the iconic portrait of the father
of Chinese communism, Mao Zedong, or revolution-
ary martyr Che Guevara.
Second, propaganda is used as part of everyday
journalism giving neither photographers nor read-
ers a chance for recognizing the truth. But this onlyPROPAGANDA