job protection, as well as placating political factions.
The President did not use this as an opportunity to
demand a commitment to renewable energy. Admin-
istration spokespersons downplayed the health conse-
quences of the spill. Congress did not support a bold
approach or opening for policy reassessment. The
2011 disaster at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power facility has also failed to stir much open debate
by the administration about nuclear power plants.
Academic and NGO (nongovernmental organiza-
tion) analysts have urged a reassessment of both risk
and cost implications of nuclear power, but the U.S.
government seems more interested in calming public
fears about nuclear outfall from Japan, and perhaps
avoiding debate about the current 104 U.S. commer-
cial nuclear power reactors (NRC 2011). Weeks after
the Japanese reactors failed, news coverage about ra-
dioactive releases virtually ceased, though the plants
continue to emit significant amounts of these toxins
into the global environment. In both cases, pressures
for securing markets, for avoiding criticism that its
policies hurt industry/jobs, and the need to preserve
options for domestic production, appeared to lead to
great caution in government handling of the environ-
mental and health aspects of the disasters.
U.S. Defense Policy
Defense planning has shown some progress to-
ward sustainability. This can be seen as a continuation
of the push toward environmental stewardship in the
1990s, or just as a move aimed at improving military
readiness and effectiveness, including cost savings, as
well as adhering to federal laws and regulations. But
the logic of environmental security joins environmen-