change could wreak humanitarian disaster. As the
global population increases from six to nine or ten
billion (Gillis and Dugger 2011), the prospects for hu-
man calamity in these areas magnify. Consider the
Asia-Pacific region where four billion persons—60 per
cent of the world’s population—already live. If large-
scale ecomigration occurs here, and there are several
places at high risk, the numbers of persons involved
will truly be “unprecedented” (Asian Development
Bank 2011).
The IOM, though acknowledging uncertainty, es-
timates that 25 million to one billion people will be
displaced by climate change over the next 40 years (In-
ternational Organization for Migration 2011d). Most
of this, IOM believes, will be internal migration and
much of that will be temporary; a great deal will be
rural to urban, which creates special challenges to sus-
tainability (International Organization for Migration
2011d). Even so, this does not strongly suggest that in-
dividual states or the international community would
be much at risk, and there is a normative framework,
the General Principles on Internal Displacement, that
addresses it (Deng 1998). Will the second half of the
century be the same or different? Globalization and
climate change may actually combine synergistically
to spur more cross-border migration (Hugo 2008).
There is obvious danger in predicting climate con-
ditions beyond 2050, but that is where our focus must
lie. If climate change does not abate, but rather ac-
celerates, as it seems almost certain that it must, four
decades will be little time to shift from a humanitar-
ian/disaster relief orientation to a long-term adapta-
tion approach, with all of the changes to international
law, policy (domestic and international), and strategy
(grand and military) that will be required to deal with
“unprecedented” dispossession of peoples. Imagine
sharon
(sharon)
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