loyal to “the transcendental and constitutive consciousness that we
attain through a ‘phenomenological reduction’ or ‘putting the world in
brackets.’”^30 In fact, he relates the two reductions in orthodox fashion by
insisting that a phenomenology of emotion, “after having put the world
in brackets, will study emotion as a pure transcendental phenomenon,
not considering particular emotions but seeking to attain and elucidate
the transcendental essence of emotion as an organized type of conscious-
ness” (STE 8 ). What Heidegger adds to this approach, Sartre will
remark from now on, is the insight that what distinguishes human reality
from the object of other inquiries is the fact that “human reality is
ourselves.” QuotingSein und Zeit, Sartre explains: “the existent which
we must analyse...is our self. The being of this existent ismine.”^31 This
elicits the following “proto-existentialist” reflections:
And it is no negligible matter that this human reality should be myself. Because it is
precisely for the human reality that to exist is always toassumeits being, that is, to be
responsible for it instead of receiving it from the outside like a pebble does. And since
“human reality” is essentially its own possibility, this existent can “choose” what it
will be, achieve itself – or lose itself.^32
Moving now into the Heideggerian camp of “hermeneutical” phenom-
enology, Sartre explains that the “assumption” of self which charac-
terizes human reality implies an understanding of human reality,
however obscure, as its precondition. And this “hermeneutic of exist-
ence,” as Sartre will later employ the Heideggerian term inBN, “will be
sufficient foundation for an anthropology,” and this anthropology “will
serve as the basis for all psychology” (STE 9 ). This “translation” of
Heidegger’s project of a “fundamental ontology” into an anthropology
and a philosophical psychology is doubtless the epitome of the kind of
misreading ofBeing and Timethat Heidegger himself and many of his
followers have decried over the years. But our point here as elsewhere is
not the accuracy of Sartre’s reading of these authors, but to understand
what he makes of his interpretation. It is there that his originality will
appear. At this stage and in this little text, Sartre is defending the
(^30) STE 8.
(^31) Ibid.See Martin Heidegger,Sein und Zeit, Elfte, unvera ̈nderte Auflage (Tu ̈bingen: Max
32 Niemeyer Verlag,^1967 [^1927 ]),^41.
STE 9. SeeSein und Zeit, 41.
Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 97