appeal to an abstract, normative human nature.^21 The intersubjective into which
I am indubitably thrown by mycogito, he insists, is a world of subjectivities, that
is, of otherfreedoms. In fact, Sartre tarries with the idea of collective conscious-
ness hitherto anathema in his thought when he claims that: “The subjectivity that
we thereby attain as a standard of truth isnot strictly individual in nature, for we
have demonstrated that it is not only oneself that one discovers in thecogito,but
also the existence of others. Contrary to the philosophy of Descartes or Kant,” he
continues, “when we say ‘I think,’ we each attain ourselves in the presence of the
other, and we are just as certain of the other as we are of ourselves” (EH 41 ).It is what he now calls “fundamental situation” that accounts for the
“absolute” character of free commitment as distinct from its relative
expression in diverse historical periods. He is, in effect, continuing to
draw on the ontology ofBNto counter historical relativism. Thirty years
later, Sartre will repeat this heretical Marxist claim in a discussion with a
pair of young Maoists when he asserts: “Freedom without alienation is
an idea which transcends class lines and historical periods and [which]
pertains to the very constitution of human reality” (ORR 342 ). By then,
the ontology ofBNhas been subsumed, if not replaced, by the dialectical
relations of theCritique.
- Sartre’s next premise is that “freedom, under any concrete circumstance, can have
no other aim than itself, and once man realizes, in his state of abandonment, that
it is he who imposes values, he can will but one thing: freedom as the foundation
of all values” (EH 48 ). It follows, he believes, that “the ultimate significance of the
actions of men ofgood faithis the quest of freedom itself ” (EH 48 , emphasis
added). The difference between abstract and concrete freedom is that the former
does not imply the other’s freedom whereas the latter does: “As soon as there is
commitment, I am obliged to will the freedom of others at the same time as I will
my own” (EH 48 ).
This seems to presume that my good faith/authenticity (the terms are
associated here) must acknowledge the truth of my concrete existence,
namely, that I exist “intersubjectively” and in mutual recognition of
that fact. “When operating on the level ofcomplete authenticity,” Sartre
(^21) During the questioning period after the lecture, Pierre Naville, “a Marxist intellectual of the
Trotskyite variety” (Scriven,Media, 126 ,n. 66 ), questioned the validity of Sartre’s distinc-
tion between “condition” and “nature.” Many have repeated this question over the years,
suggesting that it is a distinction without a difference, at least if one is considering “basic
condition” (seeEH 59 – 60 ).
240 Existentialism: the fruit of liberation