such commands in their “one size fits all” formulation are functions of
the practico-inert, which undermines the free, creative praxis of moral
agents either by harnessing them to the past or by limiting the scope
(possibilities) of their future. Sartre draws a major distinction between
norm, valueandimperativein order to distinguish a “true” or authentic
ethics from what he takes to be inauthentic varieties. Norms are
the common ontological structure of objects of different sorts, like
institutions(particularly laws which prescribe conduct and define sanc-
tions) andcustoms(which are diffuse and noncodified while revealing
themselves objectively as imperatives with diffuse and noninstitutio-
nalized sanctions).Va l u e s, which are also normative, refer to human
conduct or its consequences, and constitute the object of axiological
judgments (roughly, judgment expressing an assessment of favor or
disfavor). They too impose the weight of the past on the spontaneity
and creativity of our present decisions, or foreclose the extent of our
future possibilities.
It is the ambiguity of norms, for Sartre, that accounts for the ambigu-
ous or paradoxical character of ethical judgments. They can generate
authentic and inauthentic moralities accordingly as they aim for moral
autonomy and the maximization of possibilities, opening up for the agent
a “pure future” (a term Sartre adopts from Beauvoir).^23 Or, on the
contrary, they can limit the agent with imperatives or pre-given values.
As Sartre summarizes: “We shall call ‘ethics’ the totality of imperatives,
values, and axiological judgments constituting the commonplaces of a
class, a social milieu, or an entire society.”^24
This contextualization of the “totality” is significant. It smells of
relativism, possibly historicism, but, as we shall see, Sartre links it with
what he calls “historialization.” Inspired by Heidegger, Sartre introduces
the term in hisWar Diaries( 301 ).^25 But in his hands it denotes the
commitment of an agent to their present situation – the admission
of their facticity – in order to move beyond it in creative freedom or to
remain the same in repetition (as in inauthentic moralities).
(^23) Beauvoir,Ethics of Ambiguity, 82.
(^24) Contat and Rybalka 2 , “Determinism and Freedom,” 248.
(^25) See three phases of “the movement of historialization” inSFHRii: 175 or index, sv
“historialization.” The topic is treated along with “historicity” throughoutTruth and
Existence.
The Rome lecture: “Morality and Society” 363