whereas those in the inconsistent group made the
correct choice only 41% of the time.
It is clear that people often make inferences on
the basis of their expectations. Also, as Loftus (1979)
points out, an eyewitness to an accident or crime is
almost always questioned prior to the trial. In these
conversations, something may easily be said to alter
the witness’s recollection. It is the role of the foren-
sic psychologist to help identify the conditions in a
specific case that might produce distortions in
veridical testimony.
Experience has taught us that eyewitnesses to
events all too often cannot agree among themselves.
They differ in their descriptions of subjects’height,
weight, hair color, clothing, and even race. A dra-
matic illustration of this axiom was provided by
Buckhout (1975), who staged a demonstration as
part of a television program. Viewers watched a
staged purse-snatching episode that lasted but
12 seconds. Following this, viewers saw a police
lineup of six men that, the viewers were told,
might include the assailant. Viewers could call in
and render their judgments. What happened?
More than 2,000 callers responded, and 1,800 of
them were mistaken! Of course, none of the fore-
going is meant to suggest that eyewitnesses are
never correct. But it does suggest that caution
should be exercised in accepting accounts uncriti-
cally. At the very least, our legal system can use
improvement in its procedures for identifying sus-
pects (Brewer & Wells, 2011; Greene & Heilbrun,
2011). Factors of stress levels, information storage,
identification procedures, personal biases and
stereotypes, whether a weapon was present, the
age of the eyewitness, and even unconscious inte-
grative processes all need further study (Brewer &
Wells, 2011; Greene & Heilbrun, 2011).
In response to the concerns over false eyewit-
ness identification, a subcommittee was appointed
by the American Psychology-Law Society (Division
41 of the American Psychological Association) to
review scientific evidence in this area and to formu-
late recommendations (Wells et al., 1998). Web site
19-5 at the end of this chapter provides a link to the
subcommittee’s report. Briefly, the subcommittee
made the following recommendations:
■ The person who conducts the lineup or photo-
spread in the case should not know the identity
of the suspect.
■ Eyewitnesses should be told that a suspect in
the case may or may not be in the lineup or
photo-spread and that the person conducting
the lineup or photo-spread does not know
which person (if any) is the suspect in the case.
■ The suspect in a lineup or a photo-spread
should not stand out (in appearance or dress) as
being different from the others.
■ The eyewitness’s confidence in the identifica-
tion should be assessed at the time of the
identification and prior to any feedback.
In this way, it is hoped that eyewitness identi-
fication errors will be reduced (Wells et al., 1998).Jury Behavior. The better we understand the
conditions that affect how juries think and reach
decisions, the better our judicial system will be. A
great deal of research has been done on just how
jurors make sense out of evidence and process
information, how they respond to instructions
from the bench, and how they react to certain
kinds of arguments (Greene & Heilbrun, 2011).
Let us consider several examples.
Jurors are often confused by instructions from
the judge. Severance and Loftus (1982) modified
the pattern of instructions given to the jury. They
wrote instructions in active rather than passive sen-
tences and made the messages short and concise. In
addition, they gave abstract notions such as“reason-
able doubt”greater elaboration than usual. The
result was a more accurate application of the law
by jurors than is usually the case.
Even such a simple condition as the order in
which the judge’s instructions are presented can
have an effect on jurors. For example, Kassin and
Wrightsman (1979) used mock jurors who watched
a videotaped trial. They found that informing jurors
as to the requirements of proof before presenting
the evidence rather than after had definite effects.
Jurors under the former condition were more likely
to hold to the dictum of presumed innocence than
were jurors under the latter condition.FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 557