Global environmental politicsto wring important concessions at Kyoto, as did the Russian government
prior to its ratification of the Protocol. The LRTAP regime was initially weak-
ened without support from Britain, the major source of acid precipitation
in Northern Europe. A ban on the ivory trade is meaningless without the
support of Japan as the largest market for ivory. Key veto states are usually
OECD countries, but the largest developing states, notably China and India,
have played an astute veto role in extracting important concessions, as in
the ozone negotiations. Lead states need to persuade veto states of the error
of their ways, a task that will usually involve offering them some form of
compromise or incentive to drop their opposition, such as the payments to
China and India that persuaded them to sign the London Amendments on
ozone depletion, or accepting the American proposal at Kyoto to set up a
tradeable permit scheme.
The resistance of veto states is usually motivated by a desire to protect
vital economic interests. European states initially resisted attempts to freeze
CFC production because their chemical industries had not yet developed
substitutes. Japan, Iceland and Norway have championed their coastal com-
munities by resisting bans on commercial whaling (Stoett 1997 ). British
opposition to an acid rain agreement reflected a wish to protect its energy
industries from the enormous costs of compliance (Boehmer-Christiansen
and Skea 1991 ). In each case, governments have been subjected to strong
lobbying from powerful domestic economic interests opposing the regime.
One of the most effective lobby groups was the Global Climate Coalition,
which was instrumental in President Bush’s refusal to sign the Climate Con-
vention at Rio in 1992 and later in persuading the Clinton presidency to
take a tough negotiating stance at Berlin and Kyoto. It should be noted
that economic interests do not always oppose international environmental
co-operation. The insurance industry, for example, is relatively sympathetic
towards action on climate change because damage to property from rising
sea-levels and the disruption of weather patterns is likely to generate mas-
sive insurance claims (Brieger et al. 2001 ;Jagersetal. 2005 ). Moreover, where
it is clear that a changing political climate makes environmental regula-
tions inevitable, then government and industry may unite to win the deal
that best suits their national self-interest. The US government was encour-
aged to pursue its lead role in ozone diplomacy after 1988 by the Ameri-
can chemical conglomerate Dupont, which hoped to snatch a competitive
advantage over rival European chemical manufacturers in the development
of CFC alternatives (Benedick 1991 : 30–4). Nevertheless, on balance, eco-
nomic interests tend to push governments towards a veto rather than a lead
role.
Conversely, domestic political pressure from environmental groups, the
media or public opinion may persuade a government to become a lead
state.When the West German government swung from veto to lead state
on acid rain in the early 1980s, it was influenced by the rising importance
of environmental issues and the emergence of the Green Party as an electoral