ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
bringing about the Montreal Protocol by proposing key policy alternatives to
negotiators. On balance, NGOs have exerted a growing, but rarely decisive,
influence in environmental diplomacy.
Another factor in regime formation may be the nature of the problem
itself, perhaps by influencing the strength of the opposition to co-operation
or shaping the choice of solutions. Weale ( 1992 :194) identifies three reasons
why it should be easier to agree regimes for the protection of common-pool
resources such as fisheries stocks and endangered species than for common-
sink resources such as clean air (see also Young 1994 :ch.1). First, as the ben-
efits of common-pool resources can be individually appropriated it should
be easier to monitor compliance with an agreement (e.g. to check whether
afishing vessel has exceeded its catch), whereas the non-appropriability of
common-sink problems creates collective-action problems. However, there
are exceptions; for example, the limited number of CFC manufacturers has
meant that it has proven relatively easy to monitor compliance with the
ozone regime. Secondly, where benefits are not appropriable for common-
sink problems, proxy measures are often devised with the aim of negotiat-
ing reductions from that baseline figure (as with the 1990 figures for car-
bon emissions used in the Kyoto Protocol), but the inevitable arbitrariness of
such baseline figures places some countries at a comparative disadvantage to
others. For example, the marginal costs of reducing emissions in economies
that were in recession in the base year (i.e. relatively low emission levels)
will be higher than where the economy was booming. However, the fierce
disputes between EU member states over the fishing quotas underpinning
the CommonFisheries Policy (Gray 1997 )suggests that the agreement of
burden-sharing arrangements that are regarded as equitable by all parties
is a problem confronting both common-pool and common-sink problems.
Lastly, the exhaustion of common-pool resources hurts those that benefit
from them most, whereas the over-exploitation of common-sink resources
may not fall on those who cause the problem. Thus fishing communities
who will suffer from over-fishing have an incentive to co-operate in order to
protect their own livelihoods, unlike those UK companies whose emissions
are responsible for acid rain in Scandinavia.
Overall, a number of factors might influence regime formation; none
stands out as decisive. Efforts to secure international co-operation to solve
an environmental problem will be shaped by a complex mix of scientific,
economic, political and social factors. To return to the ozone and climate
change examples, it is clear that climate change is one of the most complex
and perplexing issues confronting policymakers today. Compared to ozone
diplomacy, international co-operation over climate change has been harder
toachieve because the various obstacles – powerful veto states, strongly
opposed economic interests, scientific uncertainty, a multitude of distribu-
tional and equity issues, non-appropriability and the unwillingness of citi-
zens to make lifestyle sacrifices – have proved much harder to overcome. A