ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
contributes to the improvement of the environmental problem it addresses.
At best, has the problem been resolved? One obvious proxy measure is
whether the objectives of an agreement have been achieved. More realis-
tically, has the regime achieved a ‘relative improvement’ in the problem
(Wettestad 2005 : 300–1)? Put differently, what would be the situation if the
regime did not exist? For if regimes matter we need to be sure that any
measurable improvements, such as reduced levels of pollution, are a result
of regime activity rather than other factors. This methodological problem is
illustrated by the 1979 LRTAP Convention and subsequent protocols on SO 2
and N 2 Oemissions and depositions. There is no doubt that overall emis-
sions in Europe of both gases have fallen steadily and significantly (EEA
2005a: 256–9). However, it is less clear whether reduced emissions are a
direct result of the measures introduced by the various agreements, such
as flue-gas desulphurisation equipment to coal-fired power-plants, or are
the (often unintentional) consequences of developments such as economic
restructuring in Eastern Europe, which closed many old polluting factories
and power-stations, and the privatisation of the UK energy utilities, which
prompted a rapid switch to gas-fired power-stations (ibid.; see also Wettestad
2005 :313–15).
The Antarctic Treaty banning the mining of minerals on that continent
is one clear example of a regime where the successful achievement of the
objective can be directly attributed to the regime. The Montreal Protocol
on ozone depletion is widely regarded as a success. Total global consump-
tion of CFCs fell from 1.1 million tonnes in 1986 to 70,000 tonnes in 2004,
and over that period consumption in developed countries fell dramatically
from 1 million tonnes to just 2,000 tonnes and by around 60 per cent in
developing countries. It has been estimated that, without the Montreal Pro-
tocol, the depletion of the ozone layer would have been about ten times
worse than current levels by 2050 (UNEP 2005 : 4–6). Other regimes gener-
ally regarded as successful include the Oslo Convention for the Prevention
of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft and the Conven-
tion on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
[notably tuna fisheries] in the Western and Central Pacific (Miles et al. 2002 ).
Yetthe success of a regime is often much less clear-cut than in these exam-
ples. For many years after its formation in 1946 the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) was hopelessly ineffective in protecting whales; indeed,
more whales were caught than before regulation was introduced. It was only
after anti-whaling nations seized control of the IWC and forced the imple-
mentation of a moratorium from 1986, leading to a dramatic reduction in
thenumber of whales killed, that the regime institutions began to achieve
their objectives. Although the IWC itself has no sanctions, the reluctance of
whaling nations, notably Japan and Norway, to incur the wrath of the anti-
whaling nations and of international NGOs such as Greenpeace, has ensured
their broad, if uneven, compliance with the ban (Stoett 1997 ), although the