Greening governmentis the recognition that broader social, cultural and political considerations
must be taken into account.
Thirdly, once in the political arena, all three techniques are open to con-
testation and manipulation. The uncertainties inherent in risk assessment
make it a weapon to be used in the conflicts between regulators and regu-
lated, or the developers and the public (Armour 1997 ). Some of the method-
ologies commonly used in risk assessment, such as ‘worst case scenarios’
and the inclusion of an ‘extra margin of safety’, are often accused of over-
estimating risk (Armour 1997 ;Rosenbaum 1997 ;Andrews 2006 ). While neo-
liberal critics believe that this conservative bias may unnecessarily alarm the
public and encourage the government to regulate more than is necessary,
environmentalists applaud the ‘better to be safe than sorry’ approach to
human and environmental safety, which chimes well with the precaution-
ary principle. In practice, a risk assessment is open to wide and contrasting
interpretations. Why a particular insecticide is legal in one country, but
not in another – despite similar risk assessments – can be largely explained
bythedifferent advocacy coalitions, drawn from industrial, farming, con-
sumer and environmental interests, lined up for and against a ban in each
country.
These administrative techniques are also open to manipulation. Policymak-
ers may use them to justify decisions they have already taken. Or, faced by
public opposition to a controversial project such as a new incinerator, civil
servants might employ an EIA not because it makes the decision more ratio-
nal but because ‘it enhances theappearanceof rationality and thus serves to
undermine environmental opposition to development projects’ (Amy 1990 :
63). Not surprisingly, opinion is therefore divided about the impact of EIAs
on specific agency decisions. In the USA, few projects are stopped directly
as a result of an EIA; rather EIAs ‘are more likely to compel incremental,
though sometimes environmentally valuable, modifications in major federal
programs’ (Rosenbaum2005b:201). Similarly, in the EU very few projects
are discarded as a result of an EIA. In Sweden, major infrastructure devel-
opments during the 1990s, notably the ring-road round Stockholm and the
Oresund bridge linking Sweden and Denmark, were approved after an EIA ̈
had produced no conclusive evidence regarding their environmental accept-
ability. In short, they proceeded because powerful economic interests sup-
ported them (Lundqvist 1998 : 246–7). None the less, as one Danish study
reveals, EIAs often result in limited modifications to the design, and in a
minority of cases major changes are required (Christensen et al. 2003 ).
CBA is also vulnerable to political manipulation, notably to ‘institutional
capture’ by government and public agencies. In particular, it is relatively
easy to use the discount rate, which calculates future costs and benefits, to
justify decisions made on other (political) grounds. By choosing a low dis-
count rate, public agencies have been able to justify many projects, notably
dam and irrigation works in the USA, in the face of strong environmental
objections (Amy 1990 ;Hanleyand Spash 1993 :161). Indeed, owing to its