Policy instruments and implementationobjectives because they give producers the freedom to decide how best to
meet goals and encourage speedy implementation and compliance, whilst
requiring little or no ‘policing’ by the state. Voluntary agreements may gen-
erate constructive co-operation between the state and industry along the
lines of ecological modernisation, leading to changes in the environmental
values and behaviour of both state officials and producers. Nevertheless, vol-
untary agreements have their weaknesses too; indeed, the OECD (2003b) has
concluded that their environmental effectiveness is questionable and their
economic efficiency is low. They are often unambitious, involving commit-
ments at the level of the lowest common denominator acceptable to the
least enthusiastic signatories to the agreement. An industry will often only
establish a voluntary agreement as a means of forestalling the threat of a
tougher regulation or eco-tax. Thus Swedish firms agreed voluntarily to ban
theuse of chlorine in paper-bleaching, presumably to gain good publicity
and create a future bargaining tool, only when the EPA was drafting laws
to proscribe it (Sterner 2003 :121). Generally, voluntary agreements made in
anticipation of legislation are likely to set easier targets and more relaxed
deadlines than the government would impose by other means. Voluntary
agreements are also not backed up by mechanisms for enforcing compli-
ance. The absence of sanctions may make implementation very difficult,
with free-riding a real possibility.
The effectiveness of voluntary agreements is also influenced by regulatory
styles. There have been very few voluntary agreements in the UK: most have
been unambitious and very weak – ‘many are more like codes of best practice
than what continental Europeans would classify as negotiated agreements’
(Jordan et al. 2003 :192)–yet they have still largely failed to meet their
commitments. It seems that the British voluntarist tradition co-exists with
an entrenched bias in favour of corporate interests, nurtured by the con-
tinued domination of closed policy communities in key sectors. However,
whilst voluntarism inevitably involves some compromise, it does not have
tobe as sympathetic to corporate interests as it is in Britain. The discussion
of the NEPP in Chapter 11 showed how it too has nurtured self-regulation
within Dutch industry, but as a means to implement ambitious pollution
reduction targets negotiated with particular sectors (see Mol et al. 2000 ;
Weale et al. 2000 :174–5, 220–1). The Dutch regulatory style is emblematic
of ecological modernisation as it involves close but transparent co-operation
between the state and industry, resulting in a framework characterised by a
combination of high standards and tough target-setting, but with the flexi-
bility to respond to individual needs and local circumstances. Yet even in the
Netherlands sustainable development will not be achieved through indus-
try voluntary agreements alone. Although industry might sometimes regard
the voluntary agreement as an alternative to other policy instruments, most
observers believe it is just a useful supplement to other measures (Sterner
2003 :121–2; Fiorino 2004 :413).