Environmental philosophy2.3 A typology of environmental philosophy- Shallowperspectives such as ‘resource
conservationism’ and ‘preservationism’ (see
Box2.5) are concerned about environmental
protection, but it remains subordinate to
other human interests. Shallow perspectives
accept the Sole Value Assumption: that
humans are the sole items of value. - Intermediateperspectives argue that moral
consideration should be extended to include
certain non-human entities, although the
categories included (animals? plants?) and
the reasons for extension (sentience?
capacity to flourish? protection of diversity?)
differ. A large part of environmental
philosophy falls within this category, notably
‘moral extensionist’ positions based on
sentience (Singer 1976 ) and rights (Regan
1983 ), and the ‘ethical holists’ (Callicott
1985 , 1986; Rolston 1988 , 1991).
Intermediate positions remain wedded to
some version of the Greater Value
Assumption: that human interests always
outvalue other considerations and the value
of non-humans (Sylvan and Bennett 1994 ),
or, slightly differently, that the value of
normal members of a species will never
exceed that of humans (Attfield 1993 : 22).- Ecocentricperspectives reconceptualise
ethical positions around a
non-human-centred attitude to the
environment, which involves the rejection of
both the Sole and Greater Value
Assumptions. Ecocentrics see value
residing in the ecosphere as a whole rather
than in humans or in individual entities, and
that value exists independently of humans.
Deep ecology is the most prominent
ecocentric position (Naess 1973 , 1989;
Devall and Sessions 1985 ), although other
‘deep’ positions exist, such as
‘transpersonal ecology’ (Fox 1990 ).
Adapted, with amendments, from
Vincent ( 1993 : 256).The anthropocentric–ecocentric dualism is a key conceptual distinction in
environmental philosophy.^2 Formany observers and activists, an acceptance
of a non-anthropocentric perspective is the litmus test for being green; it
is what distinguishes ecologism from other political ideologies (Eckersley
1992 ). It will be argued below, however, that the attempt to draw a sharp
conceptual distinction between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism is at best
misguided, at worst, untenable. For now, it is sufficient to note that this
simple twofold typology fails to capture the rich complexity and variation
within environmental philosophy. Several commentators have found it help-
ful to distinguish an intermediate area of environmental concern located
between the two poles of shallow (anthropocentric) and deep (ecocentric)
environmental ethics (Vincent 1993 ;Sylvan and Bennett 1994 ). The three-
fold typology outlined in Box2.3categorises the different approaches within
environmental ethics.
◗ Agreen theory of value?
Amajorconcern in environmental ethics has been to construct a green, or
environmental, theory of value, based on a concern for the whole environ-
ment, not just individual parts of it. A ‘theory of value’, as Goodin ( 1992 )