THEORY
putsit,is‘atheoryoftheGood...[which]should tell us bothwhatis to
be valued andwhy’(p. 19). It should provide a set of principles, or a code
of conduct, to guide the way we behave towards the environment. However,
this ethical enterprise draws on a range of concepts from moral philosophy,
which raise various issues that should be flagged up here, as they will keep
surfacing in the subsequent discussion.
First, what are the implications of showing that nature, or parts of nature
(e.g. animals or plants), possesses intrinsic or inherent value? Greens hope it
will encourage us to change our behaviour towards nature, but others might
say that it means nothing: just because nature has value does not imply
that someone has a moral duty to behave towards it in certain ways. These
different interpretations point to two distinct questions which are often
runtogether in the literature: one is a philosophical question about the
kind of value that inheres in nature; the other is a more political question
about how to motivate people to act on the recognition of that value. It is
often difficult to maintain the distinction between the two questions, but
this chapter focuses on the former, although the latter issue will also be
discussed, especially in the conclusion.
Secondly, some writers argue that if, say, animals do have intrinsic or
inherent value, then they also haveinterests(perhaps in living a full life?) or,
stronger still, that they possess certainrights(a right to life?). They then try
toshow that the possession of interests or rights creates obligations orduties
concerning the way we should behave towards animals. However, there is
atendencytomakesomebigjumpshere. Consequently, in assessing such
claims, it is important to distinguish between the possession of interests or
rights and the existence of duties. Just because a chimpanzee might have an
interest in living a full life does not necessarily mean that I have a duty to
ensure that it can flourish. Similarly, I might concede that a chimpanzee has
aright to life but deny that this right gives me an obligation to do all in my
power to protect it. Conversely, I might deny that the chimpanzee has a right
tolife yet still acknowledge that I have duties to it (not to treat it cruelly?).
In short, there is no necessary symmetry between rights and duties.
More broadly, without assessing the validity of claims about the interests
or rights of animals, it is important to be aware that terms such as interests,
rights and duties carry considerable conceptual baggage from moral philos-
ophy. For example, one common approach in political philosophy would
argue that only those creatures which are capable of making a contract can
be moral agents with corresponding rights and duties. As animals clearly
cannot carry out responsibilities or duties, according to this contractarian
view, they cannot have rights (Rawls 1973 ). Of course, there are objections
tothis interpretation: for example, on what grounds do we ascribe rights to
babies or the senile who cannot carry out such duties or responsibilities?
The simple point being made here is that debates about the appropriate-
ness and accuracy of applying this kind of human moral discourse to the
non-human world lie at the heart of environmental ethics.