THEORY
Despite the prima-facie anthropocentrism, O’Neill claims that this involves
no reversion to narrow instrumentalism. Rather, just as Aristotle taught us
tocare for our friends for their own sake, and not for the benefits it may
bring to us (such as self-satisfaction or anticipated reciprocity), so we should
promote the flourishing of non-human living things as an end in itself. Thus,
‘care for the natural world is constitutive of a flourishing human life’ (ibid.:
24). Similarly, Raz ( 1986 )offers the example of a close relationship between
aman and a dog. The man’s life is richer and better because of that rela-
tionship. So the dog has value not just because it causes feelings of security
and comfort in the man (instrumental value) but because of the constitu-
tive role it plays in enhancing the quality of his life (inherent value)^18 (see
Box2.1). Raz suggests that this kind of inherent value is insufficient to jus-
tify according rights to dogs, although it may still be sufficient to create
duties to protect or promote their well-being (Raz 1986 :178).
The approaches above are just two examples from a range of moral exten-
sionist frameworks. Neither is complete, but both have something interest-
ing to offer. The existence of these intermediate theories of value suggests
that the search for a single definitive value system to underpin an environ-
mental ethic may be doomed. Instead, green political theorists might be
better advised to accept familiar intuitive arguments, like Dworkin’s, that
aplurality of value theories exist and that there is no hierarchy among
them. This notion of a plurality in value theories is not controversial in
itself. However, while many writers argue that we need to determine which
is the ‘right’ or ‘best’ theory, the suggestion here is that there may be some
advantage in accepting an eclectic spread of theories.^19
First, it allows for different considerations to apply in different cases.
Asingle value theory may be good at dealing with one type of ethical
problem but less helpful for another. An eclectic approach recognises the
virtue of drawing on a range of value theories – utilitarian, rights-based,
ecocentric and so on – to help deal with different types of problem. Thus
Brennan ( 1992 : 28) argues that the value systems we use to justify (1) killing
abadly injured animal to put it out of its suffering; (2) preserving the life
of a human in severe pain; (3) protecting a (non-sentient) tree by forcibly
restraining a vandal from damaging it, might involve different moral con-
siderations. Secondly, the sheer complexity of many environmental issues
suggests that there may be more than one way of viewing the same prob-
lem, as is often the case in public policy. Perhaps no single value system
provides an exhaustive framework for dealing with a problem. Indeed, an
environmental ethic might also draw on a range ofanthropocentricarguments
about how humans should treat other humans, such as the need for intra-
generational justice and the obligations we owe to future generations (see
Chapter3). Such explicitly anthropocentric debates are often excluded from
green political theory, but with the increasing dominance of the sustain-
able development discourse in public policy they have gained in significance
(Dobson 1998 ).