THEORY
Put differently, how can greens be certain that the principles of democracy,
decentralisation, social justice and non-violence are the best means of reach-
ing the sustainable society?
Goodin ( 1992 )provides the best formulation of this problem with his dis-
tinction between the greentheory of valueand the greentheory of agency.
He argues eloquently that the significance greens attribute to the theory of
agency – the means of getting there – is wrongheaded. Instead, the green
theory of value, which underpins the case for sustainability, should take
priority (Goodin’s own theory of value is outlined in Chapter2). This eco-
logical imperative provides the unified moral vision that binds the green
agenda together; without it the green message lacks legitimacy, coherence
and direction. Goodin’s vision is consequentialist: ‘it is more important that
theright things be done than that they be done in any particular way
or through any particular agency’ (ibid.: 120). In any irreconcilable conflict
between the two, the theory of agency will always be subordinate to the
green theory of value. It may be desirable that Good actions coincide with
Right actions – that democratic, non-violent methods achieve the sustain-
able society – but it is not essential. Put simply (and simplistically), green
ends justify the means.^6
Most radical greens recoil at the consequentialist implications of Goodin’s
thesis because it might justify using authoritarian or coercive measures to
reach a sustainable society. So, are there good grounds for rejecting Goodin’s
claim that ecological outcomes trump procedures? It is not enough for
greens, rooted as many activists are in the emancipatory new social move-
ments and New Left of the 1960s and 1970s (see Chapter4), simply to express
apreference for participatory democracy, non-violence and egalitarianism.
They also need to show that without them an ecologically sustainable soci-
ety is unattainable. If they cannot do so, then perhaps greens must either
drop their radical political and moral agenda, or concede that environmen-
tal outcomes are less important to them than doing things the ‘right’ way.
The force of Goodin’s argument stems from distinguishing between the
theoriesof value and agency. Eckersley ( 1996 )argues that this sharp delin-
eation is flawed, and that greens are right to say that the means are as
important as the ends. She criticises Goodin’s own theory of value for being
too narrowly based on the non-human world, and therefore providing an
insufficient grounding for a green political theory. Instead, the green theory
of value should be expanded to incorporate the value of autonomy and self-
determination: ‘the freedom of human and non human beings to unfold in
their own ways and live according to their ‘‘species life”’ (Eckersley 1996 : 223).
If moral priority is attributed to autonomy, then it is essential to establish
political arrangements that will allow human (and non-human) autonomy
toflourish, such as social justice, non-violence and grassroots democracy.
This emancipatory interpretation of green politics suggests a blurring of
the Right and the Good so that thewaysomething is done is part of what
makes ittherightthing to do – a clear rejection of Goodin’s consequentialist