THEORY
may be quite averse to considering wider questions, such as the possibility
of environmental damage elsewhere. They may even try to free-ride on other
communities by producing pollution that damages those living downstream
or downwind. Hostility or indifference between communities may be accen-
tuated by the existence of economic inequalities between them; perhaps a
poor community might feel less co-operative towards a richer neighbour.
It is not difficult to imagine a community being highly sensitive towards
its own local environment but unconcerned by damage further afield. It
may, therefore, require a central agency (the state?) to persuade localities to
change their behaviour. Even if all communities were willing to act collec-
tively to protect the environment, there would still be a role for a central
agency to co-ordinate their actions. Yet, resolute in its rejection of such a
central agency, the green anarchist model gives no adequate explanation
of how the necessary co-ordination might take place (Goodin 1992 ; Martell
1994 ).
On balance, the problem lies not with decentralisationper se,butwith
thewaythe dominant ecoanarchist model, characterised by its distrust of
thestate, narrowly defines it. Decentralisation does not mean that there
should be no central state, let alone no state at all, yet that is what many
greens seem to want. Indeed, where international co-ordination is required,
green distrust of the state sometimes overrides the ecological imperative.
This ecoanarchist model of decentralisation has come under strong attack
from writers sympathetic to green politics (Eckersley 1992 ;Goodin 1992 ;
Martell 1994 ;Barry1999a,inter alia). Indeed, the emergence of a debate
about the nature of the ‘green state’ has been one of the most significant
contemporary developments in green political theory (Eckersley 2004a; Barry
and Eckersley 2005 ;Paterson et al. 2006 ). Most contributors to this debate
are working towards a green theory of the state; in short, they want to
transform the state rather than abolish it.
Eckersley (2004a)offersthemost developed model of a green state. She
identifies three major challenges to the transition to a green world: the
anarchic system of sovereign nation states (see Chapter9), the promotion of
capital accumulation and the ‘democratic deficit’ of liberal democratic state
capitalism. She also highlights three countervailing positive trends – envi-
ronmental multilateralism (see Chapter9), ecological modernisation (see
Chapter8)and deliberative/discursive democratic practices (see Chapter11).
Together, these trends underline the continuing significance of the nation
state. Rather than accept the popular view that globalisation has rendered
the sovereign state largely impotent, she argues that the state is still the most
important political institution in the struggle against global environmental
destruction; it is one of the few institutions with the capacity and legitimacy
to implement the radical changes that greens demand (p. 7). It is therefore
essential that this powerful state be sympathetic to green objectives; more-
over, if it is to fulfil the role of ‘public ecological trustee’ (p. 12), then it
should also be a ‘good’ state. Sovereignty and democracy are key elements