combinatorial system. In neither of these approaches are theunits of thissystem nouns and verbs;they are entitieslike
individuals, events, predicates, variables, and quantifiers. Instead of the relations of domination and linear order found
in syntax, semantic structure has such relations as logical connectives, functions that take arguments, quantifiers that
bind variables, and the relation of assertion to presupposition. Thus meaning has an inventory of basic units and of
means to combine them that is as distinct from syntax as syntax is from phonology.
Moreover, not all semantic distinctions play a role in syntax. Just as the phonological distinctions amongstar, galaxy,
nebula, andcomethave no impact on syntax, neither do the semantic differences among them. This suggests that we
ought to attempt to evacuate all semantic content from syntactic structure, just as we removed phonological content:
structures like (21a) should be perfectly adequate for syntactic purposes.
In short, we come to see semanticsnotasderivedfro msyntax, but as an independentgenerative syste mcorrelated with
syntax through an interface. It instantiates the thoughts that language expresses; syntax and phonology are the means
by which thoughts are converted into overt expressions.
We will bedealing at some lengthwiththecharacteristicsofsemanticsand thesyntax–semanticsinterface in therestof
thebook, but a major overallpointshould beintroduced here. Thereis a recurringtendency tothink either that syntax
can be derived fro mse mantics or that the syntax–semantics interface must be relatively simple—in other words, that
the for mof language is a good key to the for mof thought. However, generations of philosophers and gra m marians
have assured us that this is not the case; and we would do well to pay heed.
For instance, tochoose about thesimplestpossiblecorrelation, itis frequentlyassertedthat nouns name“things,”such
as houses, horses, doctors, and tables; hence the category Noun can be derived directly fro m(or directly correlated
with) semantics. But what about earthquakes and concerts and wars, values and weights and costs, famines and
droughts, redness and fairness, days and millennia, functions and purposes, craftsmanship, perfection, enjoyment, and
finesse? Thekinds ofentitiesthatthese nouns denotebear noresemblance toconcreteobjects. To assert thattheymust
have something in common semantically with concrete nouns merely begs the question.^59 What they actually have
124 ARCHITECTURAL FOUNDATIONS
(^59) Langacker (1987; 1998) argues that the syntactic category Noun corresponds to the semantic category Thing, where“a‘thing’is...defined as any product of grouping
and reification”(1998: 19). However, the examples cited above go far beyond Langacker's, and even with his more limitedset, he admits,“I have no definite proof for this
conceptual characterization of nouns.... It is merely offered as a coherent proposal.... I personallyfind it hard to imagine that fundamental and universal categories like
noun and verb would not have a conceptual basis”(1998: 19). I think it safe to consider this simply a statement of ideology.