38 China The Economist March 12th 2022
Mr Xiplacesa betonRussia
C
hinese communist partyelites can picture an endgame to
the Ukraine war that suits China very well. In Beijing, scholars
and highranking government advisers predict that today’s shows
of Western unity will fade sooner or later, as sanctions fail to break
Russia and instead send energy prices soaring. In their telling the
conflict will hasten America’s decline and slow retreat from the
world. A crumbling of Americanled alliances will then usher in a
new global order, involving spheres of influence dominated by a
few, ironwilled autocracies, China chief among them.
As for liberal democracies that have taken the lead in writing
global trade rules or defining universal values and human rights
since the second world war, their sway is being ended by a form of
majority rule, Chinese analysts boast. Western envoys in Beijing
note that 141 countries voted to condemn Russia’s invasion of Uk
raine at the unGeneral Assembly. Chinese scholars retort that the
40 countries that abstained or backed Russia—among them China
and India—account for most of the world’s population.
The tricky part for China involves the war in Ukraine before
that longedfor endgame. China hates to side with losers, and for
now at least, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, is not winning
the fight that he picked in Ukraine. That is awkward for China’s su
preme leader, President Xi Jinping, who less than a month before
the invasion signed a remarkable statement with Mr Putin on the
margins of the Beijing Winter Olympics. In it China and Russia
stood sidebyside in rejecting natoexpansion in Europe and
American alliancebuilding in Asia. They agreed that the promo
tion of democracy is a Western plot.
In the diplomatic drawing rooms of Beijing, there is debate
about whether Mr Putin told his host, Mr Xi, that he was going to
launch a war with Ukraine less than three weeks after that agree
ment. A popular view is that Mr Xi knew that Russian forces were
massing for a possible invasion—not least because China spies as
siduously on Russia—but may have accepted assurances from Mr
Putin that any war would be over in as little as a week. Envoys ar
gue that neither the Russian nor the Chinese leader expected such
resistance from Ukraine, such ineptitude from Russia’s army,
such unity from Europe nor such resolve from members of the
natosecurity alliance, including previously unthinkable deliveriesoflethalaid from such conflictavoiding powers as Germany.
“They thought the West was decadent, and that Europe is a giant
Disneyland where Chinese couples go on honeymoon,” says a dip
lomat based in Beijing, in pithy summary. In a country with nor
mal opposition politics, Mr Xi’s mistakes would be dangerously
illtimed. In late 2022 he is expected to challenge longstanding
norms and seek a third fiveyear term as supreme leader at the
20th Party Congress, the party’s highest decisionmaking body.
China’s diplomats initially waffled about Ukraine. Russia’s in
vasion tramplessupposedly sacred Chinese principles about na
tional sovereignty and territorial integrity. Heeding those princi
ples, China declined to recognise Russia’s annexation of bits of
Georgia in 2008 and of Crimea in 2014. In 2022 China’s diplomats
took a day to adopt a stance of proRussian pseudoneutrality,
blaming America for cornering Russia by letting former Soviet sat
ellite states into nato. Some Europeans thought they heard China
moderating its tone, and voiced hopes that China might mediate
in Ukraine. Alas, with Mr Xi’s prestige in play, China has little in
centive to push Mr Putin to accept anything resembling defeat.
On March 7th Mr Xi redoubled his bet on Mr Putin. The foreign
minister, Wang Yi, told journalists at the annual session of parlia
ment that China’s and Russia’s “rock solid” friendship is a strate
gic partnership against American attempts to suppress China, and
what is more brings peace and stability to the world. Mr Wang was
delivering a message from Mr Xi, diplomats say. Scholars tell for
eign contacts that China cannot debate the justness of Russia’s
war, because to defend Ukraine is to side with America.
Christoph Heusgen, chief foreign policy adviser to Germany’s
thenchancellor Angela Merkel from 2005 to 2017, has spent many
hours in meetings with Mr Xi. Speaking from Germany, he recalls
that China’s policies became markedly more selfconfident and
assertive when the “forceful” Mr Xi became party chief in 2012, in
contrast with his predecessor Hu Jintao, a cautious party bureau
crat. Still, he calls Mr Xi a calculated risktaker. “The Chinese take a
risk when they think they can get away with it,” says Mr Heusgen,
giving the example of China’s crushing of democracy in Hong
Kong, which ultimately generated limited international protests
and sanctions, reflecting the economic importance of that finan
cial centre. He contrasts China’s loathing of foreign criticism with
Russia’s indifference when it is isolated at the un.For China, it is always about Chinese interests
To outsiders, it is obvious that embracing Mr Putin is harming
China’s reputation, especially when Chinese state media and for
eignministry spokesmen repeat vicious Russian disinformation
about Ukraine without blushing, while refusing to name Mr Putin
as an aggressor. Mr Xi seems unperturbed. The dismaying expla
nation may be that he believes confrontation to be a prudent
choice. China’s leader has reportedly told officials calling for a
cautious stance over Ukraine that they are deluded if they think
that America will ever tolerate China’s rise. In public Mr Xi likes to
give his people the impression that China’s rise is unstoppable. He
told a consultative assembly on March 6th, “The contrast between
governancein China and chaos in the West has grown more nota
ble.” If Mr Xi believes his own rhetoric and is sure that China will
secure the mightisright world order he seeks, then Ukraine’s ag
onies matter less to China than might be supposed—as long as
Chinese firms are not hit by sanctions on Russia,andtrade ties
with Europe remain intact. Such selfabsorptionisgood for do
mestic morale. It is a perilous way to calculate risks.nChaguan
China’s backing for Vladimir Putin’s war is all about its contest with America