62 Finance & economics The Economist March 12th 2022
ity. The highquality collateral makes this
market less susceptible to runs, making
banks (and their clients) less vulnerable to
crises. And it is backstopped by the Fed,
which has acted as lender of last resort
since a series of liquidity wobbles in 2019.
Longerterm credit conditions are also
weathering the storm remarkably well.
Spreads on risky highyield (“junk”) bonds
have been rising since the beginning of the
year but, having started at nearhistoric
lows, are nowhere near the levels they
reached in March 2020.
For Lotfi Karoui of Goldman Sachs, a
bank, that is unsurprising. Around a fifth
of the $1.6trn American highyield bond
market is issued by oil, metals and mining
firms that are benefiting from, rather than
being hurt by, ballooning commodity pric
es. More generally, issuers tend to be sit
ting on high levels of cash and are using
spare revenues to pay down debt, keeping
their bondholders happy. Europe’s smaller
€450bn ($496bn) highyield market, being
geographically closer to the war, has been
hit correspondingly harder. But even there,
investors are yet to take serious losses.
A fortnight into a conflict that could
end up being measured in years, any claim
that credit conditions will remain benign
indefinitely would be foolish. Mr Karoui
points out that central bankers were bound
to guard against a moneymarket shock, as
that was what led to disaster during the cri
sis of 200709. More dangerous are the
risks monetary guardians have less experi
ence with: who can tell, for instance, if a
prolonged war will lead to another, much
broader gummingup of global supply
chains? Yet for now at least, theWest’sfi
nancial system is proving vastlymorere
silient than that of Fortress Russia.n
A
s onedoorslamsshut,another
creaks open. In the past fortnight the
global pressure on Russia’s finances has
increased dramatically. Meanwhile, in
Iran, the grip of sanctions is set to be
relaxed again. In 2018 America withdrew
from a multilateral nuclear accord with
Iran. A yearlong negotiation to revive it
has moved to the final stages. A deal
appears close. It is not unhelpful to its
chances that an accord would bring
Iranian oil back to the global market.
Iran’s experience is instructive. In the
past decade it has suffered recessions,
devaluations and chronic inflation under
the pressure of worldwide sanctions. Its
economy has been whacked. But it has
not collapsed. That is in large part be
cause Iran’s manufacturers have proved
resilient. Tehran’s flourishing stock
market is testimony to the economy’s
hardiness. Many of the firms that have
survived and prospered are listed there.
American sanctions have been a fact
of life in Iran for decades. They began in
1979 when President Jimmy Carter im
posed a ban on imports of oil from Iran
and froze Iranian assets held in America
following the seizure of the American
embassy in Tehran. But sanctions on Iran
really started to bite when other coun
tries joined in. To press Iran into curbing
its nuclear programme, a wave of in
ternational sanctions was imposed and
steadily tightened between 2010 and
2012. Iran’s oil exports and banks were
targeted. The foreign assets of its central
bank were frozen. And commercial
banks worldwide were proscribed by
America from financing any business
with Iran in dollars. Since then, a sanc
tions regime of varying degrees of sever
ity has remained in place.
The damage has been extensive. Iran’s
oil exports fell from 2.5m barrels per day
in 2011 to1.1min2014.Itseconomy suf
fered deep recessions in 2012 and 2018.
The embargo on Iran’s oil exports left a
large hole in government finances. Lack
ing access to its reserves or reliable dollar
revenue from oil exports, the authorities
have been unable to support the exchange
rate. The result has been chronically high
inflation. There has been a lot of hardship.
The latest World Bank report on Iran refers
to a lost decade of negligible gdpgrowth.
It might have been a lot worse, though.
There are three explanations for Iran’s
resilience. First, though sanctions have
been extensive and assiduously policed,
they are subject to leakage. Iran has been
able to export several hundred thousand
barrels of oil a day. Much of it ends up in
China, marked as oil from Malaysia, Oman
or the United Arab Emirates (uae). Sanc
tionsbusting is risky. But some privately
owned refiners are willing to take the risk
in exchange for a hefty price discount.
And dollars are not the only hard cur
rency: there is the yuan, of course, but also
the uae’s dollarpegged dirham.
A second source of resilience is export
diversification. Iran has a range of manu
facturing industries. Some of the bigger
ones, such as mining and metalbashing,
benefit from access to cheap, reliable
energy. In addition Iran has land borders
with several populous countries, in
cluding Pakistan and Turkey. A chunk of
Iran’s landbased trade is undocumented
and thus hard to police.
A third factor is import substitution.
The weaker rial has put imported goods
beyond the reach of many Iranians. But it
has been a boon for manufacturers serv
ing the home market of 83m. Go shop
ping in Tehran, says a local, and you will
find Iranianmade clothing, toys and
household goods. “If there were a global
selfsufficiency index, Iran would be
ranked highly,” he says.
Iran’s stockmarket reflects this resil
ient economy. Some of the larger firms
are on the sanctions list, but hundreds of
smaller ones are not. Stocks have proved
a good hedge against devaluation and
inflation. Many locals have noticed this.
The market exploded in 2020 as retail
investors piled in. That minibubble has
since burst. Stocks are cheap again, says
Maciej Wojtal of Amtelon Capital, a fund
that invests in Iran. The median priceto
earnings ratio for the top 100 companies
is around five, based on the forecasts of
local analysts.
Iran’s leaders have boasted of a “resis
tance economy”. But its hardiness mostly
reflects a bottomup struggle for basic
survival, not a topdown strategic choice,
argues Esfandyar Batmanghelidj of
Bourse & Bazaar, a thinktank, in a recent
essay. Economies are made up of ordin
ary people. They adapt to changed cir
cumstances the best they can. For Irani
ans, there is now a real prospect of better
days ahead. For the Russian people, the
painful adjustment is just beginning.
ButtonwoodPersian lessons
How to explain Iran’s economic resilience in the face of harsh sanctions