The Economist March 12th 2022 Leaders 9
I
f youbelieve China’s diplomats,relationswithRussiaare
“rock solid” and the friendship between Xi JinpingandVlad
imir Putin has “no limits”. Western sanctions areabouttoput
those warm words to the test. Russia needs an economicandfi
nancial lifeline. It would like to use China as a conduitthrough
which to continue trading with the rest of theworld.China,
however, must strike a delicate balance betweenhelpingMrPu
tin stand up to their joint rival, America, and retainingitsown
access to the global financial system. No doubt toMrPutin’sre
gret, its financial aid to Russia is likely to be qualifiedatbest.
Although China abstained in un votes condemningRussia
for invading Ukraine, its rhetorical support hasbeenmoreful
some. On March 7th, as civilian casualties
mounted, Wang Yi, the foreign minister, called
Russia his country’s “most important strategic
partner”. It is just a month since Mr Xi and Mr
Putin heralded a new era for their countries. As
well as preserving relations, China probably
wants to undermine the legitimacy of sanc
tions as a tool of Western policy, given they
have been used against it over Hong Kong and
Xinjiang. Chinese firms may spot an opening in Russia as West
ern ones, such as McDonald’s and Shell, close their doors.
Bloomberg news says that some are eyeing cheap energy assets.
Yet this embargobusting brotherhood faces several prob
lems (see Finance & economics section). China’s technical abil
ities are no substitute for the West’s. cips, its payments network,
has a small global footprint and low volumes and relies on send
ing messages through swift, a European body from which some
Russian banks are now barred. Another difficulty is that Chinese
multinationals with a legal presence in Westernallied coun
tries may fall foul of the existing sanctions regime. China’s in
ternational banks are wary. Volvo (based in Sweden but owned
bya Chinesefirm)andTikTok(runfromSingaporebutChinese
owned)havesuspendedsomeoperationsinRussia.EvenChi
nesefirmswithouta legalpresenceintheWestcouldbehitby
“secondarysanctions”,whichtakeaimatthirdcountriesthat
helpthesubjectofprimaryones.Americahasnotyetusedthis
weaponoverRussia,butitmight.Chinesebanksthatdealtwith
IranandNorthKoreawerepenalisedbyAmerica.
Givenallthis,China’shelptoRussiaislikelytobehalfheart
ed.ItmaysticktoitsexistingRussiantradearrangements,hop
ingthatAmericawilltoleratethem.Chiefamongtheseisenergy.
Chinareceived32%ofallRussiancrudeexportsin 2020 and17%
ofitsexportsofliquefiednaturalgas.Chinamayalsoconduct
tradeandfinancialtransactionsthroughsmall
erbanksthatdonothavea legalpresenceinthe
West,usingroublesandyuanratherthanthe
dollar.ItmayalsograntRussia’scentralbank
accesstoits yuanholdings.Last, Chinawill
probablytrytolimittheoverallscaleoftrade
volumesandpaymentflowssoastoavoidpro
vokinga directconfrontationwithAmerica.
Chinese officials must juggle several priori
ties. China wants to see Russia survive these sanctions, to teach
America and allies that they are not a magic weapon, but is an
xious to limit collateral damage to Chinese interests. In the pro
cess, it plans to learn from Russia’s mistakes. If it comes to blows
with America, China wants its financial system to be shielded.
Its aims will include improving its payments system and diver
sifying its $3.2trn of reserve holdings out of Western currencies
and accounts by, for example, investing in commodities. It
could get foreign firms and governments to issue more securi
ties in China’s own capital markets, creating a new pool of assets
for China to buy. Russia may hope for a Chinese bailout;China’s
priority will be to learn from a case study of failure.n
A bit. But it willmostlyseektolearnfromRussia’smistakes
China’s goods trade with Russia
$bn
150
100
50
0
10052000 2115
Will China help Russia?
Sanctions
“O
f course we’regoing to take refugees,” promised Boris
Johnson, Britain’s prime minister, as Ukrainians dodged
Russian bombs. “The ukis way out in front in our willingness to
help.” You hardly dare imagine what unwillingness would look
like. Britain’s treatment of Ukrainian refugees so far has com
bined footdragging, hardheartedness, ineptitude and dishon
esty. It is sadly typical of the government.
As the invasion began, European Union countries quickly
agreed that all Ukrainians could enter without visas and could
live, work and receive welfare for at least a year. By contrast, the
country that Mr Johnson calls “Global Britain”, which supposed
ly left the stodgy, bureaucratic euto pursue closer relations with
places (like Ukraine) that are outside the bloc, came up with the
meanest offer imaginable. The home secretary, Priti Patel, said
Ukrainians might be granted refuge if they had close family
members already in Britain. But they would have to obtain visas
before being let into the country. After all, Russian infiltrators
and “extremists” might be trying to sneak in. Officials even in
sinuated that Ireland was hazarding Britain’s security by open
ing its doors.
And where could people blasted out of their homes obtain a
visa? Not in Calais, the nearest port to Britain. Ms Patel did not
want to process applications there, she told Parliament, lest a
“surge” occur. Ukrainians who turn up in Calais have been given
a KitKat bar and a packet of crisps and told to apply online, then
make their way to Paris, Brussels or Lille for an appointment a
The treatment of Ukrainian refugees gives the lie to Britain’s global boasts
Here’s a form and a KitKat
British help for Ukrainian refugees