most of what we need’’ for ‘‘detailed description, classiWcation and comparison’’
and the ‘‘explanatory problem is simply that of describing relevant segments of the
system in suYcient detail to expose what happens or happened.’’ Case studies of
institutions can be dressed up as a revitalized institutionalism and British political
scientists can claim they wear the latest fashionable clothes. But, if you look closely
little has changed. Barry ( 1999 , 450 – 5 ) concludes there is no shared intellectual
agenda based on the new institutionalism, no shared methodological tool kit, and
no band of synthesizers of the discipline. The new institutionalism is little more
than a cloak with which Whigs and modernist-empiricists can pursue the kinds of
work they long have done unruZed by the pretensions of behavioralism and
rational choice.
The same argument can be made for Australian political science. Aitkin ( 1985 ,
4 – 6 ) notes the discipline was shaped by the strong intellectual links with Britain
and the dominance of law, history, and philosophy in the universities. Formal-legal
studies were alive, even dominant, well into the 1980 s (see Jinks 1985 ). It is hard
to discern the local impact of the new institutionalism (see McAllister et al. 2003 ,
part 2 ) and the impact of rational choice was even less (see the locally inXuential
critique by Stretton and Orchard 1994 ).
4 Where did We Come From—
Formal-legal Analysis?
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
The study of political institutions is central to the identity of the discipline of
political science. Eckstein ( 1963 , 10 – 11 ) points out, ‘‘If there is any subject matter at
all which political scientists can claim exclusively for their own, a subject matter
that does not require acquisition of the analytical tools of sister-Welds and that
sustains their claim to autonomous existence, it is, of course, formal-legal political
structure.’’ Similarly, Greenleaf ( 1983 , 7 – 9 ) argues that constitutional law, consti-
tutional history, and the study of institutions form the ‘‘traditional’’ approach
to political science, and he is commenting, not criticizing. Eckstein ( 1979 , 2 )
succinctly deWnes this approach as ‘‘the study of public laws that concern formal
governmental organizations.’’
The formal-legal approach treats rules in two ways. First, legal rules and
procedures are the basic independent variable and the functioning and fate
of democracies the dependent variable. For example, Duverger ( 1959 ) criticizes
electoral laws on proportional representation because they fragment party systems
94 r. a. w. rhodes