and undermine representative democracy. Moreover, the term ‘‘constitution’’ can be
narrowly conWned to the constitutional documentation and attendant legal judg-
ments. This use is too narrow. Finer ( 1932 , 181 ), one of the doyens of the institutional
approach, deWnes a constitution as ‘‘the system of fundamental political institu-
tions.’’ In other words, the formal-legal approach covers not only the study of
written constitutional documents but also extends to the associated beliefs and
practices or ‘‘customs’’ (Lowell 1908 , 1 – 15 ). The distinction between constitution
and custom recurs in many ways; for example, in the distinctions between formal
and informal organization. Second, rules are prescriptions; that is, behavior occurs
because of a particular rule. For example, local authorities limit local spending and
taxes because they know the central government (or the prefect, or a state in a
federation) can impose a legal ceiling or even directly run the local authority.
Eckstein ( 1979 , 2 ) is a critic of formal-legal study, objecting that its practitioners
were ‘‘almost entirely silent about all of their suppositions.’’ Nonetheless, he
recognizes its importance, preferring to call it a ‘‘science of the state’’—staatswis-
senschaft—which should ‘‘not to be confused with ‘political science’ ’’ (Eckstein
1979 , 1 ). And here lies a crucial contrast with my argument.Staatswissenschaftis not
distinct from political science; it is at its heart.
The formal-legal approach is comparative, historical, and inductive (Rhodes
1995 , 43 – 6 and for the usual caricature see Thelen and Steinmo 1992 , 3 ). Finer ( 1932 )
is aWne exponent of the comparative approach (and see Eckstein 1963 , 18 – 23
and Bogdanor 1999 for more examples). In sharp contrast to many of his contem-
poraries, Finer did not adopt a country-by-country approach but compared
institution-by-institution across countries. He locates his institutional analysis in
a theory of the state. For Finer ( 1932 , 20 – 2 ), the deWning characteristic of the state is
its legitimate monopoly of coercive power (see also Sait 1938 , ch. 5 ). He surveys the
main political institutions ‘‘not only in their legal form, but in their operation’’
(Finer 1932 , viii), as they evolved. Political institutions are ‘‘instrumentalities’’
which embody the ‘‘power-relationship between [the state’s] individual and
associated constituents’’ (Finer 1932 , 181 ). Then and only then does he begin to
compare the political institutions of America, Britain, France, and Germany. His
analysis covers the elements of state organization, including: democracy, separation
of powers, constitutions, central-local territorial relations, and federalism. Finally,
he turns to ‘‘the principal parts of modern political machinery, namely, the
Electorate, the Parties, Parliament, the Cabinet, the Chief of State, the Civil Service
and the Judiciary’’ ( 1932 , 949 ). His approach is not narrow and formal. It is
grounded in a theory of the state and explores both the evolution of the institutions
and their operation. The critics of the institutional approach do not do justice to
his sophisticated analysis.
Formal-legal analysis is also historical. It employs the techniques of the historian
and explores speciWc events, eras, people, and institutions. History is extolled as
‘‘the great teacher of wisdom’’ because it ‘‘enlarges the horizon, improves the
old institutionalisms 95