it has been seen as pointing in quite the opposite direction, towards a revival of
more microscopic, self-helping, neighborhood-based arrangements, in place of the
infantilizing and regulatory support mechanisms of central government (Green
2000 ). For some commentators the widespread decline within many ‘‘advanced’’
cultures of citizen involvement in clubs, campaign groups, neighborhood schemes,
and voluntary societies is the prime index of the breakdown of civil society (i.e. the
‘‘bowling-alone syndrome’’ diagnosed by Putnam 2000 ). But for others the
very opposite is true: The autonomous, free-standing, ethical-choice-making
individual—unencumbered by partisan community ties, and attached only to
the remote even-handedness of the law—is precisely what the enterprise of
twenty-Wrst century civil society is all about (Seligman 1995 , 200 – 19 ; Harris 2003 ,
7 – 9 ). Likewise, in the eyes of some authorities, ‘‘civil society’’ necessarily entails a
much more comprehensive and ‘‘universalist’’ national culture, whereas to others it
means a much more diverse and pluralistic one. (The contrast here is nicely
captured in the philosophic diVerences between French and British approaches
to questions of ethnic and religious integration.) Religion itself has a similarly
ambivalent standing in many current debates, some participants portraying civil
society as by deWnition ‘‘secular’’ (with religion conWned to an entirely ‘‘private’’
sphere); whilst others stress the close correlation between religious observance of
all kinds (Christian, Jewish, and Islamic) and high levels of public participation in
the voluntarist, philanthropic, ‘‘not-for-proWt’’ sectors (Ireland, Israel, Belgium,
and the Netherlands being outstanding examples of this correlation) (Barber
2002 b, 8 ). Similarly, within the Global Civil Society movement, there have been
many grades of opinion about ways in which ‘‘civil society’’ meshes with diVerent
historic cultures. Are such attributes, for example, as democracy, gender equality,
liberal marriage laws, and the leadership role of an educated middle class, absolute
prerequisites, or are they matters of cultural autonomy that should be treated as
variable and locally negotiable (Barber 2002 b, 7 – 11 )? The relation of ‘‘global civil
society’’ to globalization itself—whether of an economic, cultural, linguistic, or
merely ‘‘Internet’’ kind—remains highly contentious, with many ‘‘civil society’’
enthusiasts hating one kind of global interaction while relishing others. And,
echoing the historic origins of the term, there have been some like Habermas
and Skocpol who have strongly questioned the severing of civil society from its
links with the traditional concept of a well-ordered state. This questioning seems
particularly pertinent, in view of a survey of twenty-seven countries in 2001 which
found that more than 42 per cent of the income of NGOs and other ‘‘non-proWt-
making’’ bodies was in fact coming from government and tax-Wnanced sources
(Habermas 1962 ; Skocpol 1996 , 19 – 25 ; Barber 2002 b, 8 , 23 ).
Civil society therefore remains a curiously obtuse, malleable, and much
contested idea, diYcult to deWne categorically by reference to eitherwhat it isor
what it is not. It is widely assumed that (whatever else may be the case) it is not
compatible with fascism, feudalism, patriarchalism, totalitarianism, communal
140 jose harris