chapter 12
...................................................................................................................................................COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONS
...................................................................................................................................................josep m. colomer
1 Introduction
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Constitutions came earlier than democracy (Strong 1963 ). During the late Middle
Ages and early modern times, constitutions were mainly devices for establishing
rights and limiting powers, functions that are still emphasized in certain academic
literature on constitutions (see, for example, North and Weingast 1989 ; North 1990 ;
Buchanan 1990 ; Weingast 1995 ). But as the old powers to be limited were auto-
cratic, constitutionalism advanced almost naturally, together with the expansion of
suVrage rights and democratization.
A constitution is usually deWned as ‘‘a set of rules’’ for making collective
decisions (see, for example, Buchanan and Tullock 1962 ; Elster and Slagstad 1988 ;
Mueller 1996 ). Enforceable decisions made by means of rules can solve human
coordination and cooperation dilemmas (as discussed by Brennan and Buchanan
1985 ; Hardin 1989 ; Ordeshook 1992 ). However, diVerent rules may favor diVerent
decisions with diVerently distributed beneWts. Two sets of rules can be distin-
guished: (a) those ‘‘to regulate the allocation of functions, powers and duties
among the various agencies and oYces of government,’’ and (b) those to ‘‘deWne
the relationships between these and the public,’’ which in democracy are based on
elections (Finer 1988 ).