governments had been exempt from major regulatory statutes adopted by Congress
(Posner 1998 , 22 – 3 ). However, as the value of federalism as traditionally deWned
gradually waned, state and local oYcials found themselves subject to the same
kinds of constraints and regulations as individuals and companies. The lack of
funds accompanying such restrictions only made the situation worse. In spite of
President Reagan’s view of government, the 99 th Congress, for example, passed
environmental legislation which imposed signiWcant new costs on subnational
governments (Conlan 1998 , 193 ).
The decreasing inXuence of state and local government oYcials in Congress was
at least partially due to their fading inXuence in their political parties. As long as
they had been inXuential in the two political parties, they exerted informal inXu-
ence in Congress. (The fact that mayors and county oYcials were important actors
in parties helps to explain why governors were never able to become the ‘‘supreme’’
subnational leaders and had to compete with county and municipal elected
oYcials for inXuence). Once they lost their leverage in the nomination process,
their political clout in Congress declined. In fact, state and local oYcials competed
with congressional candidates for money and visibility. Deference to the norms of
federalism declined (Posner 1998 , 79 – 80 ).
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), adopted in 1995 , was initially
seen as a major force in restoring the balance between Washington and subnational
governments. State and local governments were to be protected from mandates
which cost them money. Yet in fact, mandates continued to be adopted (Posner
1998 , 182 , 190 ). The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 reformed welfare and while providing generous block grants also
imposed numerous new requirements on the states (Posner 1998 , 189 ; Weaver
2000 ; Winston 2002 ). Although that reform was a major example of devolution,
it gave statesXexibility while also constraining them.
In theWrst term of the second Bush administration, waivers from federal require-
ments became particularly important in the area of Medicaid. That program, more
expensive than Medicare, was consuming roughly 20 percent of state budgets by 2003.
The waivers granted by the Bush administration allowed states both to improve the
quality of care and to cut the number of beneWciaries. States did both, and, to critics,
those states who used their waivers to cut the number of beneWciaries in an eVort to
control rising costs symbolized the problems created for vulnerable populations when
the federal government loosened its regulatory grip. However, the need to
obtain waivers is seen by many state oYcials as emblematic of the problems with
federal controls on the states. Jeb Bush, Republican governor of Florida, argued:
States should not need waivers to establish meaningful co-payments, charge fair premiums,
target care for certain populations or geographic areas. States should be able to implement
managed care in its various forms, establish nursing-home diversion programs, or imple-
ment consumer-directed care, withoutWrst seeking waivers from Washington. (SeraWni
2003 , 1078 )
american federalism and intergovernmental relations 253