government would be far more vibrant if it engaged with core debates in the
comparative politics literature. I try to build such bridges in this chapter. Of course,
conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions lie at the heart of most current
classiWcations and deWnitions of regimes (Elgie 1998 ). I adopt Shugart’s (Chapter
18 , 348 )deWnition. ‘‘Pure’’ parliamentary democracy is deWned by two basic features:
‘‘executive authority, consisting of a prime minister and cabinet, arises out of the
legislative assembly;’’ and ‘‘the executive is at all times subject to potential dismissal
via a vote of ‘no conWdence’ by a majority of the legislative assembly’’.
Mapping theWeld is further complicated because the study of the executive is
both a subset of the study of parliamentary government and related to broader
concepts than parliamentary government (such as democratic eVectiveness,
political leadership, presidentialism, and the comparative analysis of regimes).
This can both diVuse the focus on the executive and oversimplify the analysis of,
for example, democratic eVectiveness (which is shaped by more than the actions of
the executive). I range widely despite these dangers, however, given the importance
of placing the executive in its broader context.
Finally, the topic is also inextricably linked to broader trends in political science
and the way we study politics. It is no coincidence that the shift from the formal-
legalism of the Westminster approach to modernist-empiricism to rational choice
institutionalism parallels trends in political science. My conclusions go with this
Xow. I counterpoise rational choice institutionalism with the interpretive turn
because that is the recurring debate in present-day political science.
TheWrst section of this chapter discusses existing approaches to executive gov-
ernment—Westminster, modernist-empiricism, core executive, and rational choice
institutionalism. Second, I look at core debates and challenges in the study of
parliamentary executives, the main examples of which are Britain, the Common-
wealth, and Western Europe (see Shugart, Chapter 18 , Table 18. 1 ). For these countries,
I cover: the presidentialization of prime ministers, executive coordination,
policy advice and policy capacity, and the comparative analysis of parliamentary
government. Finally, I look at the future research agenda, covering rational choice
institutionalism’s redeWnition of theWeld as the analysis of veto-players; and the
interpretive turn and the analysis of court politics and traditions.
2 Approaches to Executive
Government
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
For most of the twentieth century, theWestminster approachwas the most common
framework of analysis. The notion of the ‘‘Westminster system’’ is remarkably
324 r. a. w. rhodes