agenciesarekeyactors.Thereisasecondstoryofprimeministerialpowerthatfocuses
on the problems of governance and sees the prime minister as constantly involved in
negotiations and diplomacy with a host of other politicians, oYcials, and citizens
(for a summary and critique see Marinetto 2003 ). Prime ministers are just one actor
among many interdependent ones in the networks that criss-cross Whitehall, West-
minster, and beyond (and there can be no clearer example than the dependence
of Blair on Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer; see Seldon 2004 ).
The decline of cabinet government is the reverse side of the presidentialization
coin, but what exactly has been lost? Pat Weller ( 2003 , 74 – 8 ) distinguishes between
the cabinet as the constitutional theory of ministerial and collective responsibility,
as a set of rules and routines, as the forum for policy-making and coordination, as a
political bargaining arena between central actors, and as a component of the core
executive. Those commentators who justify talk of the demise of cabinet by treating
policy-making and coordination as the deWning functions of cabinet have failed to
notice that these functions have been carried out by several central agencies,
including but not limited to the cabinet, for over half a century. This conclusion
also stands for most West European cabinets (see Blondel and Mu ̈ller-Rommel
1993 b). To suggest that any postwar prime minister abandoned the doctrine of
collective responsibility is nonsense. Leaks are abhorred. Unity is essential to
electoral success. Dissenters go. Prime ministers have a pragmatic view of individ-
ual ministerial responsibility; ministers go when the political costs of keeping them
exceed the costs of a resignation.
In sum, the fortunes of ‘‘presidential’’ prime ministers vary markedly between
arenas and during their period of oYce. It is misleading to focus only on the prime
minister and cabinet because political power is not concentrated in them, but more
widely dispersed. It is contested, so the standing of any individual—prime minister
or chancellor—or institution—cabinet or Treasury—is contingent. As Helms
( 2005 , 259 ) concludes from his comparison of American, British, and German
core executives, ‘‘there is rather limited evidence of presidentialization,’’ although
Poguntke and Webb ( 2005 b, 347 ) disagree, arguing the various shifts ‘‘generatea
greater potential for, and likelihood of, this ‘presidential’ working mode’’ irrespective
of regime (emphasis added). Fifty years have elapsed in the UK, so not there yet
then! Fear not, the debate will go on, and on...
- 2 Executive Coordination
Problems of coordination loom large and come in two guises—the practical strand
of how do we improve it, and the academic strand of what is it and when and why
does it work.
Pollitt and Bouckaert’s ( 2000 , 79 – 83 , 165 – 6 ) review of recent public sector
reforms in ten countries shows that most struggle to balance specialization and
executives in parliamentary government 329