holding the powerful to account in Westminster systems: individual and collective
ministerial responsibility, public sector reform and managerial accountability, and
network accountability or the problem of many hands.
- 4 Ministerial Responsibility
The doctrine of ministerial responsibility resembles ‘‘the procreation of eels’’
(Marshall 1986 , 54 ). Thus, it ‘‘can be suspended or breached except in circumstan-
ces when the Prime Minister, having considered the immediate and long-term
political implications, feels it to be more honoured in the observance’’ (Marshall
1986 , 223 ). Similarly, on collective responsibility, ‘‘Cabinet may have a policy, if it
wishes, of permitting public disagreements between Ministers even on matters of
major policy without endangering constitutional principles’’ (Marshall 1986 , 225 ).
In short, ministers do not resign and cabinets disagree in public. Whether
ministerial responsibility and collective responsibility apply depends on the
political standing of the minister and the judgment of the prime minister
(see also Woodhouse 2003 ).
This summary errs on the side of dry. It is worth noting that 43 percent of all
resignations between 1945 and 1991 in the UK were for sexual orWnancial scandals,
not personal or departmental error (Dowding 1995 , 165 ). There is a serious point to
this aside. It suggests that ministerial responsibility is alive and well, but not in its
conventional formulation. It is no longer the prime minister and the political
standing of the minister that decides a resignation—but the media maelstrom (see
also Woodhouse 2004 , 17 ).
The position diVers little in Australia where, ‘‘if individual ministerial respon-
sibility ever meant that ministers were expected to resign for major policy blunders
or for serious errors of maladministration by a government department, it is dead.’’
Nonetheless, collective responsibility is alive and well: ‘‘If ministers cannot publicly
support a cabinet decision or the general direction of government policies, they
resign’’ (Thompson and Tillotsen 1999 , 56 ).
- 5 Civil Service Accountability
Sir Richard Wilson ( 1999 ), former head of the British home civil service, ques-
tioned how good top civil servants were at policy advice and how often their advice
had been evaluated. It was a rhetorical question. There were no formal mechanisms
for holding the civil service to account for its policy advice. In Australia, political
executives in parliamentary government 331