So, if we focus on ministerial responsibility, we have a seriously lopsided view ofaccountability in parliamentary government. Rather, we need to think about webs
of accountabilities; about sets of organizations, not the individual minister; and
about legal, professional, and managerial accountability as well as political.
4 Policy Advice and Policy Capacity
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
Over the past quarter of a century there has been a major restructuring of the state
in Western Europe. Whether conceptualized as the hollowing out of the state or the
shift from bureaucracy to markets to networks, a recurrent concern in the changes
has been the capacity of the core executive. Some argue the core executive is
‘‘overloaded;’’ that is, the demands on the core executive exceed its capacities.
For others, and especially prime ministers and ministers, the concern has been to
get more and better advice. The public service was found wanting and replaced
with a plurality of advisers. Finally, because of government reform, critics charge
there has been a politicization of advice.
- 1 Government Overload
Although the phrase ‘‘government overload’’ is associated with the neoliberal
critique of big government (see for example Brittan 1975 ), it also has a speciWcif
related meaning, referring to the excessive workloads of ministers and prime
ministers. Peter Hennessy ( 1995 , 174 – 5 ) turns to psychiatry and occupational health
to argue that ‘‘institutional overload’’ and ‘‘personal overstretch’’ undermine both
health and the quality of decision-making. Ministers and prime ministers are all
too keenly aware of the pressures. There are endless suggestions for strengthening
‘‘central capability,’’ as it is known, to combat such pressures (see Lee, Jones, and
Burnham 1988 ). For example, Hennessy ( 2000 , 539 – 41 ) seeks to distance No. 10
from a frenetic everyday life by developing both a plurality of analytical capacities
and a greater capacity to provide risk and strategic assessments. He wants a
‘‘small-but-smart model’’ of No. 10 in which the prime minister is ‘‘the guardian
of the government’s overall strategy’’ backed by a risk assessment unit with a wide
remit: ‘‘all those areas and activities where setbacks, catastrophes or unforeseen
developments can (rightly or wrongly) be laid at a PM’s door.’’
The problem and solutions are not peculiarly British. Peters, Rhodes, and Wright
( 2000 ) cover trends and reforms in the administrative support for core executives
in twelve countries. They identify a battery of shared pressures on core
executives in parliamentary government 333