executives, including the media and the personalization of executive politics,
international aVairs, especially security and defense post- 9 / 11 , and the pressure
for domestic policy coordination. As a result, most countries have developed and
continue to develop support structures so their core executive can cope.
- 2 Plurality of Advice
In Westminster systems, the civil service had a monopoly of advice and this advice
was collated and coordinated by the cabinet through its ministerial and oYcial
committees and the Cabinet OYce. Campbell and Wilson ( 1995 , 59 – 61 , 294 – 6 )
argue for the death of the Westminster approach insisting the civil service monopoly
of advice to ministers has been broken. We now have competing centers of advice
and coordination, with the civil service putting together packages of advice from
many sources, insisting not on their monopoly but on staying ‘‘in the loop.’’ Prime
ministers have their own sources of advice, whether from advisers, management
consultants, or think-tanks. For example, total staVemployed by the British prime
minister rose from 71 in 1970 to over 200 under Blair (Kavanagh and Seldon 1999 ,
300 ), creating ‘‘the department that-will-not-speak-its-name’’ (Hennessy 2002 , 20 ).
It is important to keep this increase in perspective. For example, in Britain, the total
number of political and policy advisers remains small compared with the 3 , 429
members of the senior civil service. Most ministers have only one or two advisers.
The growth of advisers has been and remains controversial. For example, in
Australia, there has been much criticism of their role in protecting the minister—
for creatingWrewalls that protect them not only from outside criticism but also
from his or her department, from unpleasant and unwelcome information, and
from parliament (see Marr and Wilkinson 2003 ). The problems are endemic. In
both Australia and Britain, there has been much debate about their numbers, cost,
expertise, conduct, roles and responsibilities, and relationship to civil servants. The
British government introduced a code of conduct (see Blick 2004 ). The Australian
government denied there was a problem. Clearly we have plural sources of advice,
ministerial advisers who are here to stay, and problems that will not go away. It is
less clear there will be eVective management of their roles or accountability for
their actions, irrespective of whether there is a code of conduct.
- 3 Politicization
During Margaret Thatcher’s premiership fears were expressed that the civil service
would be politicized. They have not subsided since. The Royal Institute of Public
Administration ( 1987 , 43 ) concluded, ‘‘the appointment process has become more
personalised’’ but ‘‘we do not believe that these appointments and promotions are
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